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MEMOIR OF MR. RUFUS WOODWARD.

THIS sketch of the life and character of Mr. Woodward has been delayed, in the hope of receiving from Edinburgh, some farther account of his last sickness and death. With the best materials, it is sufficiently difficult to write the mental history of any one, in such a manner that exact justice shall be done to the deceased, and others instructed. Especially is it difficult to unite the faithfulness of a biographer with the affection of a friend: a multitude of mingled feelings come thronging upon the mind, and fix the attention too exclusively on those features in the character of the deceased, which won and secured his affection: a crowd of recollections rising up, demand the recording pen for those passages of his life only, connected with the scenes in which they moved together.—His intimate friends cannot, in this delineation, find a portrait distinct and glowing like that which memory has drawn upon their own hearts; it is hoped that they will find a correspondence with truth, and with “that which they themselves do know.” Others, and especially those whose path may lie in the walks of contemplative life, may find something to gratify a rational curiosity, and some incentives to the attainment of kindred excellencies of character. The lamented subject of this memoir, was not anxious for the praise of men while he was among us; and now, so

much respect shall be paid to his memory, as not to bestow unreserved eulogies upon him when dead, that would have pained his modesty when living.

RUFUS WOODWARD, the son of Dr. Samuel Woodward, was born in Torringsford, (Con.) July 16th, 1793. Residing at home, he had the advantage of spending his early years in a family much respected for their good sense and amiable disposition; and to this circumstance, as an active cause, must be referred many of those valuable traits in his character, which, in subsequent life, were matured by his own exertions. It appears, that during this period, he showed little of that precocity of mind which sometimes indicates genius, but which, perhaps, more often, is the harbinger of intellectual impotence. He entered on the studies of childhood with little interest; as is not unfrequently the case with those whose mental habits, so far as they are formed, lead them to prefer ideas to words, until from use, the latter, by suggesting trains of thought in the mind, fully assume their representative character, and become nearly identified with the former.

When he entered upon the period of youth, he gradually acquired a fondness for study. It was only at the vestibule of the temple of learning that he discovered any reluctance, for soon after it appears that he became a confirmed votary. Mr. Goodman, in his funeral sermon, says of him, ‘while other youths

were regaling themselves, during the long winter evenings, with their sports and pastimes, he was often found no less eagerly engaged by the fire-side, in the acquisition of knowledge. Study was his pastime from early youth, and intellectual pleasures the pleasures for which he had the highest relish.'

Having completed his preparatory studies under the Rev. Dr. Backus, of Bethlem, he entered Yale College in 1812, with the reputation of an accurate scholar. Describing himself at this period, he remarks; 'I was addicted to no gross vices. My prejudices against religion were strong. Among the most obstinate early habits with which I had to struggle, was that of speaking and thinking rapidly and confusedly. I had also an early habit of loose and wandering thought which I have taken great pains to correct. On account of this habit and that of thinking rapidly, my conversation was rather abrupt, broken, and deficient in connexion and ease.' Facts like these, in his intellectual history deserve notice, because they correspond with the mental defects of which many are conscious, and which from discouragement they do not attempt to remove. He attempted with success, and the masters of mental science tell us, that what has been done once may be done again.

In a very concise account of his college life, after mentioning his successive Tutors with feelings of gratitude, in high terms of commendation characteristic of each, he proceeds: "I come now to a man who has been the means of doing me more good than any individual on earth, except my parents. Dr. Dwight was a father to us. His instructions formed a sort of chart for the voyage of life. His example furnished the sublimest lesson of morality and religion that I had ever seen. His manners were those of a refined and accomplished gentleman. He was particularly distinguished for posses-

sing a vast fund of practical information, and for an ability, as well as inclination, to communicate it to his pupils. He had arranged his ideas in such a manner, that when he had occasion for one, all that related to the same point, followed after in quick succession. Perhaps his reliance upon facts was such as to lead him occasionally into credulity and dogmatism.—But take him all in all, he was a very superior and a very excellent man. Never, while I live and breathe, shall I cease to remember with gratitude, the benefits I received from his instruction and example. I attended a course of excellent lectures on natural philosophy, by Professor D.; and of chemistry and mineralogy, by Professor S. I was exceedingly fond of physical science, and the result of my attention to it has been a total change of my views of the material world. The charm of this study consists in witnessing constantly a wonderful adaptation of means to ends. This is particularly true of some parts of chemistry and vegetable physiology. My views of many other subjects, experienced no less change in the course of my college life. The tendency of the college honours in which I shared, was to teach me the emptiness of such pleasures, and of human applause in general. The example of the officers of college, and the instructions of Dr. Dwight, gave me new views of the subject of religion. Instead of associating with it the idea of vulgar ignorance, of austere manners, and of a gloomy life, it assumed an air of cheerfulness, of refinement, and of an enlightened regard to the welfare of man. An examination of the evidences of Christianity, by Dr. Paley, had also a powerful influence on my mind. At one time, I hoped I was a Christian; at another, doubted. * * * On the whole, I was graduated at college, a very different person from what I was when I entered; and I rejoice exceedingly

that I did enter. The advantages of a college education, do not consist principally, in attainments and habits that are completed; but in commencing habits for life—such for example, as a habit of reflection, of observation, and of study. A habit of reflection, particularly, was one of the most valuable that I acquired in college. It has led me to examine subjects for myself, and especially to study a subject elementarily.”

He was as a student distinguished among his class-mates, for his diligence and solid attainments; and he drew their eyes upon him, not as one superior to all others as a scholar, but as one, who in his love of truth, whether found in speculative, or practical principles; in his admiration of intellectual excellence, and in his determined pursuit of all the high objects of a liberal education, showed that he had within him the elements of a character, which, if brought into contact with favourable circumstances, might be moulded into a form of intellectual strength and moral dignity. Though remarkably punctual in preparing the required exercises, he seemed to be governed, rather by a desire to furnish himself with materials in the acquisition of knowledge, and instruments in the cultivation of his mental faculties, for usefulness in life, than by any present advantage in the applause of others. Being influenced by such a desire, he applied himself to study under the influence of a motive that is constant in nature; while those who are governed only by a desire for a high reputation at college, though they may make themselves distinguished as classical scholars, act under the influence of a motive that is evanescent in its nature, producing no excitement after the individual has left the scene of his classic triumphs.

His deportment was exemplary. Having taken the station of a pupil, he had the feelings of a pupil.

Having nothing refractory in his temper, he was not inclined to oppose the requisitions of the government, merely because they were requisitions. He was not inclined to regard with a jealous eye, every change of measures growing out of the necessary change of circumstances, as an encroachment upon the rights of the students. He sought for no distinction as the self-appointed guardian of these rights, by flying in the face of authority. Nor did he merit the praise of ingenuity, by his skill in evading the laws of the institution. Nor did he belong to that class of students, who delight in disorder, but have too much caution to engage in it; and who generously countenance the thoughtless and excitable ones, in those violations of propriety which they dare not commit themselves. He had no taste for the beauties of disorder and moral deformity.

“After I was graduated,” he says, “I taught an Academy in Stratford nine months; and one in Wethersfield a year. It is a very useful employment, and were it not for that consideration, I hardly know what would have supported me through such labour. No single effort in the business is very laborious; but it is a constant succession of petty efforts, which are gradually exhausting the mind of its energy, and wearing down the constitution.

“I devoted my leisure hours in Stratford, almost exclusively to study. I occasionally visited the Rev. Mr. D. and Dr. Johnson.”—Of the latter, he remarks, that he is a venerable sage of the age of ninety. “He is, on the whole, as venerable an object as I ever beheld. View him at a short distance, and you would suppose he must be in the last stages of decrepitude. Sit down by his side and talk with him, and you would indeed find him deaf enough, and trembling with age over the grave; but you would see something within that looks very

much like divine.—A mind refined, rich, clear, comprehensive, benevolent, and astonishingly eloquent. His very voice is eloquence—clear trembling, deep-toned, soft, musical, and perfectly expressive of the internal workings of his mind. * *

* * * * * My plan of study was as follows :—the evening I devoted to the study of some elementary work of science, such as Stewart's Philosophy, Smith's Wealth of Nations, &c. I devoted two hours in the morning to the business of thinking. At noon, and after school in the afternoon, I read some leisure book, like Shakspeare, Johnson, Goldsmith, &c. On the whole, I think my attainments made this year were greater than those of any other year of my life. The habit of reflection, which I commenced at that time, (and which perhaps I never should have commenced, had it not been for what I had heard from Dr. Dwight,) I regard as one of the most valuable that a man can form. I am convinced too, that the course I then began to pursue, for the acquisition of valuable knowledge, is the best, viz. the *study*, and not the *mere reading*, of elementary works. It is to no very valuable purpose that we read works of detail, mere matters of fact, unless we form some general conclusions and principles as we go along ; and these conclusions or principles are already formed, and by masterly minds too, in elementary works. We should be careful, however, not to adopt these general principles without due examination. A man, for example, would know more of the science of politics by studying thoroughly Smith's Wealth of Nations, than by merely reading in the ordinary way, all the history that was ever written.

“ This year I lost a dear brother. This was the first time I ever realized how strong are the bonds of natural affection. I had, it is true, lost a sister ; but I was then young, and she had not, for that reason, taken

so strong a hold of my affections. My grief on this occasion was exceedingly great ; though I hope it was mingled, in some degree, with that submission to the divine will which is so becoming the weakness and dependence of man.

“ My time passed away, much in Wethersfield as it had done in Stratford ; though during the latter part of my residence there, I mingled much more in society. It was at this time that I began to keep a common-place book, or at least such a one, as I think on the whole profitable. In one of these, I put down the most important general principles of a science,—leaving room under each, for those details which would illustrate the principles, and which I was to put down in a very abridged form of expression, as they occurred, either in the course of my reading, observation, or conversation. My common-place on political science is an example of this kind. In another, I put down the synopsis of an argument scattered through an octavo of 300 pages. My common-place remarks from Allison on Taste, is an example of this kind. In another, I put down a train of thought, which I had made chiefly from my own reflections, as in my common-place book entitled ‘ Religious.’ My school was an agreeable one ; and my acquaintances formed during my residence there, valuable and interesting.”

“ October 1818. Entered on the duties of my new situation, that of Tutor in Yale College, with great anxiety of mind, under the responsibility laid upon me.

“ September 1821. I am about completing the third year of my Tutorship, and bidding farewell to my class. When I look back, and see how great improvement most of them have made, I feel a degree of satisfaction which cannot be described. I trust I have not been found unfaithful ; though like all the rest of my conduct, my services have not

been just what they should have been. It requires a great degree of moral firmness, to keep constantly in view one's duty. I have been on the whole, much pleased with my situation in college. It opens a field of usefulness, affords much leisure and time for study, access to books and to good literary society.

"November 1822. I left my Tutorship in college last February, principally on account of ill health. I had not enjoyed good health for six or eight years; having had more or less of the dyspepsia. It originated I doubt not, in a want of exercise, and of due attention to my diet. Students are very prone to neglect exercise, until they begin to feel the want of it; and then it comes almost too late; for the constitution by that time is usually considerably impaired, and it is difficult to restore its vigour, so long as one lives a sedentary life. They are not sufficiently attentive also to the quality, and especially the quantity, of their food. Instead of diminishing the quantity of their food, in proportion to the diminution of their exercise, as they ought, they eat fast, stimulate their appetites by means of condiment. &c., and then overload their stomachs. This falls peculiarly hard upon those who have commenced their studies from an active life."

As he entered upon the office of Tutor with a deep feeling of responsibility, so he performed its duties with a most scrupulous regard to the general interests of the college, to his brethren in office, and to his immediate pupils. In imparting knowledge to his division, while he was sufficiently critical in the stated exercises, he made it an important object to connect together the different branches of instruction, and to show how these are related to the practical duties of life;—that thus they might make every kind of improvement that would adorn them as mere scholars cloistered in a college, or as men when called to a

more enlarged theatre of action. Disposed to act in concert with the other officers, and under the direction of the laws of the institution, he cheerfully did his part, whether of instruction or of discipline. While he valued the affection of those whom it was his duty to instruct, and to govern, he at the same time appeared to have very little of that moral cowardice, which shrinks from odium; for his was the virtuous mind that is ever attended by that 'strong-siding champion,'—conscience.

November 1822, he remarks: "From the time I left college, to the present, I have been devoting my time, as far as has been practicable, to the recovery of my health. But in vain, and I am now housing myself for the winter. Being pretty well convinced that the state of my health will not soon admit of my performing the duties of a clergyman, I have come to a determination to devote what little time I can prudently, for the present, to preparing a course of lectures on political science. If it should be wanted, very well, if not, I shall endeavour to do the best I can with it.

"In the mean time, I hope to be able to do something in the way of writing on theological subjects, and should it ever be in my power I am resolved at some time or other, to attempt writing a text book for our colleges, on the science of moral philosophy."

He still persevered under much that was discouraging, in using active exertions for the recovery of his health, residing with his father in Tarringford, or with one of his brothers, either in Wethersfield or Middletown, each of whom, by his professional skill, was able to assist him in palliating his disease, as well as by the most affectionate attentions. Having derived some advantage from a voyage to Charleston, it was thought advisable that he should try the experiment still farther, in a longer voyage; and

accordingly, in July 1823, he sailed from New-York for Europe, where it was hoped that he might be able likewise to gain some mental advantages in the prosecution of his favourite studies.

August 2, 1823. He writes, 'I am at length within a few hours sail of Liverpool. You will unite with me in gratitude to our Heavenly Father that I am now so near the end of my voyage, in safety. My health is somewhat improved.'

Remaining but a few days in Liverpool, he visited Glasgow, Edinburgh, and London, in succession, and in each place he received very gratifying civilities, from the highly respectable gentlemen to whom he carried letters of introduction. His health still continued about the same; for a time apparently improving; and then he would be visited by a return of an old complaint, that exhausted his strength, and took away the flattering hopes of a recovery that he began to indulge. After beginning to recover from the effects of one of these attacks, he writes to his family friends:—

"But I confess it is a little discouraging, and not a little trying to one's patience and powers of resignation. To be sick, too, among strangers—shut up in a little room on the fourth floor, with but one window, and that through the top, and not visited by the sympathetic voice of man, woman, or child, but my chamber-maid, for five days, two or three *drops* of a fellow-lodger, and the short visits of my physician, my hostess being sick below—this tends to sadden the soul. But blessed be God, I find I can go through such scenes, though not—no not with so entire a submission as I could wish, or ought. To be entirely resigned amid long protracted and repeated sufferings, is surely one of the last lessons to be learned on this side the grave!"

It being judged adviseable, on account of the climate and some other considerations, that he should spend

the approaching winter in the south of France, he was proceeding thither, when he was again arrested by his complaint at Montreuil.

'Then,' he says, 'I was for a week in a French hotel, with a servant to wait on me who understands scarcely any thing of the English language, and a chamber-maid who knows nothing at all of it. Indeed, I was pretty much my own physician, my own nurse, and what is about as necessary, you will find, if any of you should ever be sick among strangers, and especially among such strangers as it was my lot to find at that hotel—my own comforter. But blessed be God, I am getting better again. I have to-day got back as far as this place, Boulogne. I hope to-morrow to reach Calais, thence to sail back to London, thence to Edinburgh by the first opportunity. I am, however, a poor, feeble, emaciated creature; and I know not but a few more such attacks will close my eyes for ever on all that is on this side the grave. May heaven prepare me for it, and you too—for I think of you abundantly at such times, and I know full well that you also think of me, and would hail my arrival among you once more, with all the sincerity of a long established and deep devoted affection.'

Following up his intention, which the improved state of his health enabled him to do, he arrived in Edinburgh about the 1st of November—anxious to avail himself of the advantages of attending the lectures in the University, and, as a friend remarks, esteeming the warmth of Scottish friendship, in the present state of his health, more than a counter-balance for the rigour of a northern winter.'

But his studies, his sufferings, and his life, were now very soon to have their close. The final scene is thus described in a letter from the Rev. Dr. D. of Edinburgh, to Prof. S.

My Dear Sir—How uncertain is the tenure by which our life is held! Your, and I can truly add my highly

esteemed friend, Mr. Woodward, is no more. His mortal remains are deposited in a land of strangers; but his spirit has, I trust, been taken to its native home, with God and the Redeemer. This most painful event took place here on Monday the 24th current, and the distressing duty of announcing it to you, and through you to his relations, has devolved on me. May the God of all grace abundantly sanctify to them this peculiarly severe dispensation of his holy providence, and enable us, my dear friend, to improve it for our progressive advancement in Christian godliness. At what time our dear departed friend's last letter to any of his correspondents in the United States was written, I have been quite unable to ascertain. I shall therefore give you a short statement, gathered from the notes in his travelling journal, along with what is consistent with my personal knowledge. After spending about eight days in Edinburgh, (where I had the pleasure of receiving your letters of introduction, and showing him some slight attentions, for which I felt more than rewarded by the enjoyment I had in his society and conversation,) he left this for London towards the end of August, and remained there until the 19th of October. During that period, he had formed an acquaintance with several excellent and distinguished individuals, to whom he had brought letters of introduction from America; had evidently laid himself out to acquire correct information on almost every subject, whether of science or of religion, and visited several places in the vicinity of the metropolis, though during the whole time his health appears to have been gradually declining. So early, indeed, as the 16th September, I find this entry on his notes: "am confined to my bed the greater part of my time yet—a very great trial of patience and resignation, to be again prostrated, in a land of strangers, at so great a distance from home, and

with the prospect of a speedy approach of cold weather. But may God grant that some good may come out of my afflictions. May they serve to wean me from the world, and to direct my thoughts, and feelings, and motives of conduct, towards him, and that nobler state of existence promised to the good hereafter.'

On the 20th October, he reached Calais, rode next day to Boulogne, and on the 23d to Montreuil, when he was confined so as to be unable to proceed. On the 24th, he thus wrote: 'This is a severe trial of one's power of resignation. I begin to think I shall not reach the south of France this season, and if I can get as far as Paris, I ought to feel grateful for it, and consider myself happy. God grant, if I am to leave my bones in this foreign land, like the Rev. Mr. T. I may grow in submission as hope declines, and that I too may be grateful for the kind severity with which death may be conducting me to another, and (it may be) a better world.'

With the 28th, on which he returned as far as Boulogne, being unable to proceed on his journey, his notes terminate. Subsequently he returned to London, where he received the most particularly kind and Christian attentions from Dr. Burder, son to the Secretary of the Lond. Miss. Soc., and from whom, on leaving that for Edinburgh, he received a special introductory letter to Dr. Robert Hamilton, a young physician of excellent talents, and distinguished Christian character.

On reaching this, about the 10th of November, he wrote me a short note, mentioning his arrival, his intention of spending the winter in Edinburgh, and saying that he should be glad to see me when convenient. Besides being quite unaware of his being seriously indisposed, I had so much unavoidable duty on my hands, I delayed calling from day to day, till on the morning of Thursday sevensnight, I received a note from

Dr. Hamilton, stating that he and Dr. Abercrombie had been attending him for several days, and that they considered him as very dangerously ill indeed, and that he thought it would be a satisfaction for me to see him. Almost immediately after breakfast I accordingly went to his lodgings, and found him in a much weaker state than I was prepared for, even by Dr. Hamilton's notice. His strength seemed completely exhausted, and his voice so feeble that it was with difficulty I could hear the few words he was able to speak to me. Yet on asking him how he felt, particularly as to the state of his mind, I heard him distinctly say, 'My hope rests on the sure foundation laid in Zion.' Having spoken a little with him, I prayed beside him, and I never shall forget the emphasis with which, at its conclusion, he said, Amen, or the affectionate pressure of his hand, or the "God bless you" with which he bade me farewell. Along with Drs. Abercrombie and Hamilton, I saw him again in the evening, when he appeared somewhat revived. On Friday I was prevented by indisposition from going out, but I saw him on Saturday, and again prayed beside him, with which he evidently seemed much pleased. On Sabbath I had to preach forenoon, afternoon, and evening, so that it was out of my power to call for him, and about four o'clock on Monday morning his spirit was dislodged from its earthly tabernacle.—Nothing could surpass the attention he experienced from Drs. A. and H., who indeed are influenced by the true spirit of the gospel, and who, feeling peculiar interest in him, as a stranger, but who they hoped was a Christian brother, were most anxious to do every thing for his comfort as well as relief. His body was interred in the ministers' burial ground here, in a spot immediately beneath a stone tablet in the wall, on which a

suitable inscription may be cut, or into which a small marble slab, with such an inscription, may be inserted. * * * *

When a man distinguished in the walks of active life dies, his memory long survives him, because it is connected in the minds of men, with his actions. They have only to look at what he accomplished in the senate, or the field, and his character stands distinctly before them, animated and glowing, true to life and nature. His friends, too, can point to a course of successful efforts, or to some brilliant action, and in doing this, they pronounce the best eulogy. But the retired scholar is engaged in none of those brilliant and imposing actions, that in the eyes of the people reflect a lustre on the agent, whatever may be his real worth or demerit. And when he dies, though a few will cherish his memory in their hearts, because they knew him well, and loved him well; others, as they see no train of effects flowing from his efforts, which "come home to men's business and bosoms"—regard him simply as an individual of the human family, and his death only as a "unit withdrawn from the sum of human existence." There is then the more propriety in presenting the character of such a one for a nearer inspection, that others as well as his friends may understand what were the mental and moral qualities that constituted its real worth, and by dwelling on these excellencies, may copy into themselves what they admired in him.

In looking at Mr. Woodward's character, we are not so much struck with any one or a few prominent features, as by a happy combination and symmetry of the whole. This is true, whether you regard his intellectual habits, or the active powers which gave rise to these habits, or the acquisitions which arose from them as a joint result. It not unfrequently happens, in men of highly distin-

guished reputation, that by the side of some very marked and brilliant traits, there are deficiencies equally marked, and faults equally prominent, which when subtracted from their excellencies, leave the general amount but small. They may have cultivated some faculties to the exclusion of their other faculties, or they may have placed themselves under the dominion of a particular class of feelings, until these become their master passion; or they may have sought for eminence in a narrow range of acquisitions. But he, while he sought for none of these brilliant traits, avoided the correspondent deficiencies; for he wished to cultivate his whole mind to the extent of its capacities, rather than any set of powers at the expense of the rest. He had a quick relish for intellectual excellence of every kind, as seen in others, and he loved to hold communion with those great minds who have been the lights of the world, 'by whom the torch of science has been successively seized and transmitted.' By intercourse with such minds, introduced to him through the medium of their works, he acquired an increased love for truth, in the various branches of knowledge, speculative and practical, that led him to be unsatisfied with superficial views, and in the diligent investigation of first principles, to seek for her among the innermost shrines of her temple.

The love of knowledge, united with the admiration of intellectual excellence, forming the exciting motive, the mode that he adopted in the prosecution of his studies deserves notice. The first point in his estimation to be gained, was an accurate acquaintance with his own mental defects, both in regard to habits and attainments, that he might thus be able to subject his mind to the proper discipline for establishing good habits, and apply to it the appropriate objects for promoting valuable attainments. He had read

what Newton said: 'If I have done the public some service, it is due to nothing but industry and patient thought.' His industry in acquiring knowledge, or in preparing himself for communicating this knowledge, was unwearied. You might have seen it, not only in his regular hours of study, but likewise in his seasons of comparative relaxation; for even then he was employed, either in conversation on some important topic, or in making observations upon men and things, or in committing to paper some train of thought, or in taking an abstract of some book that pleased him. His plan was, not so far to exhaust himself by some great effort, as to require complete relaxation, in order to recruit his spirits and power of attention; but it was by patient thought, perseveringly continued, to possess himself of extensive views of the various subjects of inquiry, and to weave them, as it were, into the very texture of his mind. Even in his hours of sickness, when his body was borne down by lassitude, would his mind rally its powers, not to a nervous excitement, but to a gentle exercise, which at the time appeared salutary, but in the end may have contributed to impair the energies of life.

His attainments, the fruits of his constant and well directed application, though considerably various, should be estimated by their completeness rather than their variety. Here two particulars may be mentioned; and the first is this, that he was very much in the habit of retaining the proofs in his mind upon which his conclusions were founded. This he was able very conveniently to do, because in his investigations he committed the arguments to paper, and by referring to these frequently and passing them through his mind, they became firmly associated with the conclusion, and could be summoned whenever necessary to show that his knowledge was actual, as well as habitual. A second particular is this, that he was well acquaint-

ed with subjects and sciences in their relations with each other, and with the various arts of life; and thus he was able to give a practical character to his speculations, and make them interesting and valuable to men of common attainments. He brought away from college, when he was graduated, a thorough knowledge of the books recited, and a very large amount of the instruction delivered in lectures, and less formally. Soon after that period, he devoted considerable attention, to philology and philosophical criticism, which were of great assistance to him in turning his attention to the precise import of language, and enabling him to clothe his conceptions with a graceful drapery. But the studies to which he devoted the largest share of his attention, and in which he made the greatest acquisitions, were the philosophy of the human mind, and political science. The transition from the one, which treats of man as an intellectual and moral being, to the other, which treats of the same being as a member of political society, was natural; and they both furnish, in the mighty mass of facts upon which as sciences they rest, ample scope for a mind of the largest powers. By the exercise of a discriminating judgment, which enabled him to perceive the near differences of things as well as their general correspondence, by a patience of doubting, which enabled him to take a comprehensive survey of a subject, and by rigidly applying the rules of Bacon, *the Prophet of the arts*, which have since been revealed by his followers, he obtained an uncommon degree of acquaintance with these sciences, not only as they are exhibited by the ablest elementary writers, but likewise as they are elicited by an examination of one's own consciousness, and the details of general history. His pursuits led him frequently into an examination of the causes which conspired to give currency to various opinions and in

doing this he often found by experience the truth of that maxim, 'to trace an error to its foundation head is to refute it.' A diligent examination and comparison of these writers led him to discover those great principles of philosophy, upon which all are agreed, and likewise pointed out to him the various legitimate objects of inquiry; while the facts collected from general reading and observation, when classified and arranged, would have served him as valuable materials for those original investigations which he hoped to make. He was so much in the habit of using his pen in his studies, that he almost literally obeyed the injunction, *nil sine calamo*; yet considering the amount of his writings, he published very little.*

His style is pure and simple, for the most part of an argumentative tone, yet occasionally rising into a high strain of eloquence and pathos. The force of his reasoning does not consist in its mere formalities, in a succession of carefully wrought syllogisms, nor in the mystical use of general terms, nor in bringing forward artfully constructed paradoxes, to baffle the mind of others, and exhibit his own ingenuity; but rather in a fair and manly exhibition of a subject addressed to the good sense of mankind, and producing conviction, because it is found to agree with their consciousness and observation. The oration which he delivered before the Phi Beta Kappa Society, 1822, "On the practical tendency of the moral, political, and metaphysical philosophy of the present age," will be remembered by those who heard it, as a specimen of his mode of discussion. A more favourable specimen, perhaps, might

* To the Christian Spectator he contributed the following articles: In the second volume, a Review of Memoirs of Samuel J. Mills, p. 250; An inquiry respecting Conscience, p. 337; A Review of the Means of National Prosperity, p. 358. In the third volume, On Purity of Heart, p. 225; Review of Stewart's Outlines, p. 244.

be found in a dissertation he prepared for the Connecticut Academy, "On the structure of Civil Society."

His mind showed the effects of the discipline to which it had been subject. From cultivating a habit of reflection, he obtained the power of long continued attention to the subjects of consciousness, while at the same time, he lost little of his interest in external objects, and of certain classes of these objects, he was a minute observer. His judgment was comprehensive, rather than acute, forming its decisions upon a careful survey of a subject in all its relations, rather than upon verbal distinctions, and dialectic subtleties. His memory, as it had been trained to depend more upon scientific than casual associations, was more distinguished for its retentive power, than its readiness. His taste was correct, and in the latter years of his life very much refined, by the contemplation of the various objects of grandeur and beauty with which his mind was conversant. It was more remarkable for a ready notice and admiration of what is lovely, than for detecting and dwelling on faults.

But it was not merely or chiefly for intellectual excellence that he sought. He wished to devote his improved faculties and acquired knowledge, to the high purpose of benefiting his fellow-men. He was well aware that nothing but moral excellence can meet the favour of God, or gain admission into that high world, for which the present is only a scene of preparation. "It has," he remarks, "sometimes appeared to me to be very strange, that while so much is said of the cultivation of the mind, so little is said of the cultivation of the heart. The moral powers are of a more exalted character than the intellectual; and it would seem that they demand proportionally, a more careful and assiduous culture; so also moral excellence is far more desirable than intellectual, and hence

also the superior importance of the culture of the heart to that of the understanding." He always appeared to have a vivid feeling of approbation towards virtuous actions when performed by others, and by dwelling on the character of those who habitually performed them, he acquired a high admiration, not only for the agents, but for those moral qualities that constituted the governing principle of their lives. The same qualities he admired in the benevolent author of the universe, and in the character of that Holy Being who came down from heaven, and exhibited to mortals the moral glories of the only begotten of the Father. These qualities he wished to incorporate into his own character. "I am," he remarks, "apt to consider this world as a school, where we are to be disciplined for another state of existence. Almost every thing, in the arrangement of things here, seems adapted to promote our progress in virtue and piety. The great means of our discipline are our various temptations. By overcoming temptations, we advance in moral excellence. The impressions they make on our hearts, are gradually weakened; while our habits of active virtue are strengthened, and our power of self-command increased."

Having this high admiration for moral excellence, he devoted himself with the most assiduous care to its attainment, as the grand object of his existence. He entered deeply into the consideration of those relations in which man is placed as a social and dependent being, that thus he might be able to understand his duties to God and man, founded on these relations; and that thus too he might, by enlightening his conscience, place himself more completely under its dominion. In forming his opinions, though he could not perhaps, in all cases, go to the full length of the sentiment of Burke, 'that our passions instruct our reason,' yet he was very much

in the habit of consulting his moral feelings. Such an action, he would say, cannot be wrong, whatever theory it may oppose; for it is consonant with my moral feelings. He likewise, in adopting religious doctrines, while he anxiously examined the usual proofs, was accustomed carefully to observe their moral tendency; taking it for granted that truth is favourable to virtue, and that therefore any doctrine that is shown to be unfavourable to virtue, must be false. He was convinced that God has written his will on the heart of man, as well as in his word, and that in the words of Melancthon, 'he never meant to supersede by a law graven on stone, that which he had graven with his own finger on the table of the heart.' He listened to the holy voice of nature as to the language of God, the more readily because he found that it coincided in its import with the oracles of truth. In examining the truths of Revelation, he was not satisfied with an assent to them, on a superficial view; but he went into an extended investigation of the proofs upon which the canonical authority of each separate important book is established, and then applied the rules of interpretation to the discovery of its doctrines. His mind learned to attach less importance to those points of controversy that have 'drifted to the leeward with the change of time,' than to those practical truths that can be applied daily and habitually to the heart. He watched his emotions no less carefully than his intellectual habits, that he might repress those that the word of God condemns, and encourage those that deserve cultivation.

The effects of this love of moral excellence, and of this discipline of his emotions, aided as we trust by that good Spirit whose influences he habitually implored, were strikingly manifest in his moral progress. Instead of yielding himself, as most do, to the influence of passive impressions from surrounding objects, and

changing in feelings and opinions as these objects change; he was governed by that class of motives which have very properly been denominated rational principles of action. What is my duty? What is the will of God? What is best on the whole? These were the questions that seemed to be constantly present to his mind, and in searching in his conduct for the answer he gave to these questions, we are very seldom able to discover that his understanding was under the blinding influence of passion, or confused by the complex nature of the subject, or deceived by the power of association. A friend says of him, 'he was more under the control of principle, and less under that of impulse and feeling, than any man I ever knew.' This habit of deciding upon mature reflection, may have taken away somewhat of boldness and apparent energy from his character, while it gave him the qualities of consistency and uniformity in a very high degree. There are minds, especially those formed in the scenes of active life, in which, 'on each glance of thought, decision follows, as the thunderbolt pursues the flash.' The decisions of his mind resembled the silent and regular laws of nature, whose operations can always be predicted. You had only to determine what would be his opinion of duty in given circumstances, and you would know what course of conduct he would pursue.

United to this habitual subjection of his emotions to a sense of duty, was a strong feeling of good will towards men, which seemed indeed plainly to comprise in itself that scriptural virtue, charity, so far as it fulfils the second table of the law. It is sometimes the case, that men of retired habits, who have attended for some years to the abstract pursuits of science, have perceived in themselves a growing indifference towards their brethren of the human family, which approaches even misanthropy, if they have a keen sense of the fol-

lies and vices of mankind. His studies led him to contemplate mankind in their several relations, and towards them in all these relations he appeared to have the appropriate feelings. Whatever concerned the welfare of the human race, he felt concerned him, for he was a lover of his species. Whatever concerned the welfare of the land in which he lived, he felt concerned him, for he was a lover of his country. In his intercourse with general society, which, owing to his feeble health, was not very extensive, he exhibited that Christian courtesy towards others which told them that he would not causelessly injure the feelings even of the humblest human being. Towards the opinions of others, when they differed from his own, he exhibited a uniform candour, which told them that he valued truth more than victory in argument. With his intimate friends, he was frank and confiding in the disclosure of his feelings and purposes; and if it be true that in every man's mind there is an interior circle into which none but himself and the Divinity can enter, all the concealment which he allowed in himself seemed to spring from the best of motives, and not from a regard to any personal advantage. He could perform towards his friends the high duty of kindly admonishing them of their faults, because he sought to promote their excellence as he did his own; but he seemed to dwell with the most pleasure on the bright parts of their character, and thus kept his mind free from suspicion and distrust, and incorporated into his own character the traits which he most loved in them. His temper was uniform. His manners were unaffected and pleasing. In his person he was tall, and apparently formed for strength and activity. His countenance was of a fine order of faces, containing a frank and guileless expression, suiting well with the cast of his mind.

Though unknown by profession as the disciple of Christ, those

best acquainted with him believe that piety formed the crowning grace in his character. It may indeed be viewed as the parent of the rest. 'How obvious it is,' he remarks, 'that a religion which is designed to transform us anew, should operate powerfully on our *whole* moral constitution. It should soften our rough dispositions, sweeten our tempers, and make us more amiable as well as more excellent. It should take the acrimonious speech from our lips, and make the voice cease to be a vehicle of unkindness. It will produce this effect—because it will remove the cause—it will dry up the fountain; for the character of our conversation will depend upon the disposition and feelings that are kept alive in the heart.' His habitual love to God sprung from the habitual contemplation of him in his word and in his works; perceiving in the magnificent scene around him, the proofs of his attributes, and his superintending providence, he wished firmly to associate in his mind every event and every object falling under his notice with its great author, that thus he might not only behold his presence and his glory, but likewise constantly listen to his voice. Instead of viewing the 'great and the little things of this world only as toys spread on the lap and the carpet of nature, for the childhood of our immortal being,' he wished to elevate them to their true meaning, and gather from each a serious lesson to prepare him for that being. Kindling his devotion in this manner, by direct views of God as its source, rather than from the variable feelings of others, and guarding it with a zealous care—it burned with a pure and constant flame upon the altar of his heart. As he felt a lively gratitude to God for the bestowment of his mercies, so, when these mercies were removed, he felt a correspondent resignation. Sickness, while it darkened his earthly prospects, seemed to lift his soul into a region of perpet-

ual sunshine. Instead of rendering him selfish by fixing his attention exclusively on his own wants, it seemed to quicken his social sympathies, and increase his benevolence towards others. Scarcely a murmur was heard to escape his lips. On one occasion, during a paroxysm of pain, he was observed suddenly to suppress every expression of anguish. Being asked how he could remain so quiet, distressed as he was,—‘Whisper duty in my ear,’ was his reply, ‘if you ever again witness in me the least expression of impatience.’ By previous discipline, his soul was armed with religious fortitude for enduring even the final agony. ‘As for the conduct,’ he remarks, ‘proper in a dying hour—our obligation to the performance of the duties which are still within our power, continues; and among these duties, the most difficult probably is entire resignation to the divine will. Not a word, or action, or look, should be the external sign of an unyielding, and so far as the nature of

the disorder will admit, of a discomposed spirit within. All should, if possible, be as tranquil, as serene, as the setting of an unclouded sun.’ It would be a solace to have been present at his dying hour; but God, we trust his best friend, was present, to calm his fears, and to inspire him with confidence to ‘rest his hopes on the foundation laid in Zion.’ He is gone, but he is not lost—he will still live in the virtues which his example called into existence—he will live in the hearts of a numerous circle of friends in his native country—while in the land where his ashes repose, some kindred minds will still think of him whom they now describe as the *amiable American stranger*. He is not lost; he is gone, we trust, to that high world where his thoughts loved to go—where Dwight his father, and Fisher his brother in excellence, had gone—where intellect and moral feeling, which here he cultivated with so much care, will expand for ever.

MISCELLANEOUS.

To the Editor of the Christian Spectator.

THE following little tract by Bretschneider, on the *Testimony of JOSEPHUS respecting CHRIST*, has struck me so favourably, and appears to be so conclusive, that I have thought it would not be unuseful, and might not be unacceptable, to the readers of the Spectator, to see a translation of it on the pages of that work. It appears as an appendix to his little work entitled, ‘*Capita Theologia Judæorum slogmaticæ e Flavii Josephi scriptis collecta, auctore C. G. Bretschneider, Theol. Doct. etc. Leips. 1812.*’

K.

Two passages are found in the writings of Josephus, in which he speaks of Jesus Christ; one of which, being of considerable length, is called by way of eminence, *the testimony of JOSEPHUS respecting*

CHRIST, and has given rise to many disputes among learned men. The following are the passages in question.

Antiq. XVIII. 3. 3. Γίνεται δε κατα τουτον χρονον Ιησους, σοφος ανηρειγε ανδρα αυτον λεγειν χρη· ην γαρ παρ-αδοξων εργων ποιητης, διδασκαλος ανθρωπων, των ηδονη τ’αληθη δεχομενων. Και πολλους μεν Ιουδαιους, πολλους δε και του ‘Ελληνικου επηγαγετο· ο Χριστος ουτος ην. Και αυτον ενδειξει των πρωτων ανδρων παρ’ ημιν σταυρω επι-τιμηκοτος Πιλατου, ουκ επαυσαντο οι γε πρωτον αυτον αγαπησαντες. Εφανη γαρ αυτοις τριτην εχων ημεραν παλιν ζων, των θειων προφητων ταυτα τε και αλλα μυρια θαυμασια περι αυτου ειρηκοτων. Εις ετι νυν των Χριστιανων απο τουδε ωνομασμενων ουκ επελιπε το φυλον.

Antiq. XX. 9. 1. (Ανανος) καθιζει συνεδριον χριστων, και παραγαγων εις αυ-το τον αδελφον Ιησου του λεγομενου

Χριστου, (Ιαχωβος ονομα αυτω,) και τινας ετερους, ως παρανομησαντων κατηγοριαν ποιησαμενος, παρεδωκε λευσθησομενους.

"At this time lived Jesus, a wise man; if indeed it be proper to call him a man. For he performed astonishing works, and was a teacher of such as delight in receiving the truth; and drew to himself many of the Jews, and many also of the Gentiles. This was he who is [called] Christ. And when Pilate, at the instance of the chief men among us, had caused him to be crucified, still those who had once loved him, did not cease to love him. For on the third day he again appeared unto them alive; divine prophets having foretold these and ten thousand other wonderful things respecting him. And even to this day, that class of persons who were called from him CHRISTIANS, have not become extinct."

"Ananus assembled a council of judges, and having brought before them the brother of Jesus, who is called Christ, (whose own name was James,) and certain others, and having accused them of violating the laws, he delivered them over to be stoned."

The great dispute has been whether the former of these passages be genuine or not. Many learned men have supposed, that some Christian transcriber, out of a pious regard for the interests of Christianity, and in order to afford an argument against the unbelieving Jews, inserted the whole passage; or that at least, if Josephus did make any mention of Christ, much of the language, as it now stands, has been thus interpolated.* Although it is not my intention to decide upon this controversy, nor to repeat all that has been urged on both sides of the question; yet I have thought that it might be neither uninteresting nor useless to suggest very briefly some things on this subject,

*See LESS. *Progr. I. II. super Josephi de Christi testimonio*, Goett. 1781. HENKE. *Gesch. der Christ. Kirche*. 1 Th. p. 54 sq.

which seem to me not to have received sufficient consideration.† The passage in question may indeed well cause the reader to hesitate; but if all the circumstances be duly weighed, I do not apprehend that it can be considered either as spurious, or as having suffered any change from the hands of Christian transcribers.

I. If we were to decide the question by the authority of manuscripts, there can be no doubt but that the passage was written by Josephus, and has never been corrupted. All the manuscripts which are known, exhibit the same words, in the same place and order; and they are also quoted, first by Eusebius, and afterwards by Jerom, Suidas, and others. But if all the manuscripts uniformly agree, and we have, besides, testimonies of great antiquity to the genuineness of the passage, it surely cannot justly be called in question, except upon the strength of very weighty arguments. What then are those arguments? They are drawn partly from the silence of certain writers, and partly from the character of the passage itself.

1. The most ancient Christian writers, it is said, and especially Justin Martyr, Tertullian, and Origen, have never employed this passage against the Jews; which they certainly would have done, had it been then extant. But from the mere silence of a few writers in a case of this kind, can we draw any certain conclusion which shall overturn the credit of all the manuscripts? No one will affirm this.‡ But Origen has expressly said, (lib. I. c. Cels.) και τοις απιστων [Ιωσηπος] τω Ιησου ως Χριστω, *Josephus did not believe on Jesus as the Messiah*; and again, (Comm. in Matth.) Ιησους

†For a long and learned defence of this passage, see HAUTEVILLE *Erwiesene Wahrheit der Christ. Relig.* 1745, p. 275—311.

‡For many reasons why they should not have quoted this passage, see HAUTEVILLE, l. c. p. 283 sqq.

ἡμῶν οὐ καταδεξάμενος εἶναι Χριστόν, *he did not receive our Jesus as the Messiah.* Origen therefore, it is said, could not have known of the passage in question, in which Josephus certainly acknowledges Jesus as the Messiah; and hence it is manifest that the manuscripts of Josephus in the time of Origen, (who died A. D. 254,) could not have contained those words. On the other hand, others have very justly suggested, that Origen means only to affirm, that *Josephus did not become a follower of Christ.* But passing over this suggestion, we find that between the death of Origen and the time of Eusebius, there was an interval of only *fifty* years. Is it possible that in so short a time, all the manuscripts, or even many of them, should have been thus interpolated? Can we suppose that Eusebius was hurried on against the Jews by a zeal so blind, that although he does not seek to conceal the doubts which were raised respecting the sacred books of the Scriptures, he should yet publish this passage as genuine and true, though he knew it was wanting in many manuscripts, or was written only in the margin? Is it credible, moreover, that this interpolation, which was unknown to Origen, should have immediately crept into all the manuscripts; so that neither Jerom, nor Sozomen, nor Suidas, nor any other early writer, should have stumbled upon a manuscript in which it was not contained?

2. It is objected further, that by this testimony respecting Jesus, the order of the narrative is interrupted; but if this be taken away, the proper order will be restored. The circumstances are just these: In c. 3. § 1, Josephus relates that Pilate introduced images of Cæsar into Jerusalem; but that when a tumult had been excited on account of them, he ordered them to be removed. In § 2, Pilate attempted to bring water into Jerusalem, at the expense of the temple, etc. and

in a tumult which arises, he puts to death many of the Jews. In § 3, he crucifies Jesus who is called Christ, a wise and holy man. In § 4, it is narrated that another evil (ἐτέρον δεινόν) occasioned trouble to the Jews, viz: a flagitious crime committed in the temple of Isis, at Rome; as connected with which, § 5 relates that all the Jews were banished by Tiberius from Rome. The writer then goes on, in c. 4, to describe the sedition of the Samaritans, and the suppression of it by Pilate. Now can any one justly affirm that the history of Josephus is in any way interrupted by the passage in question? Can any one show what connexion would be restored, if this were omitted? Most evidently Josephus has narrated the events in the order in which they occurred, and intended to give them no other connexion than that of succession of time. If therefore it was his purpose to make any mention of the fate of Jesus, he could have done it with propriety in no other place.

3. Another, and a more plausible objection is, that it is impossible to suppose that Josephus would speak of Jesus in this manner, and acknowledge him as the Messiah, and yet not have embraced his religion, and become a Christian. But this objection seems to be grounded on a misapprehension of the language of Josephus; for Χριστός is here not a doctrinal appellation, but merely a proper name, and is to be translated, not *the Christ*, i. e. the Messiah, but simply *Christ*. Ὁ Χριστός οὗτος ἦν, i. e. οὗτος ἦν ὁ λεγόμενος Χριστός, as it is read in the other passage, *this was he who is well known by the name of Christ, and whose followers are still called from him, Christians.* It is likewise to be remembered, that Josephus was writing, not to Jews, but to Greeks, who were unacquainted with the doctrinal meaning of ὁ Χριστός among the former people. He therefore undoubtedly wrote

the words ὁ Χριστός οὗτος ην, to signify to the Greeks, that the Jesus of whom he was speaking, was the same person of whom they had heard so much, under the name of *Christ*; and that the name of *Christians*, which was then well known to the Greeks, was derived from the surname of the same Jesus. And because he would assign a reason, why the disciples of Jesus adhered to him so strongly after his crucifixion he states that Jesus after his death appeared again to his followers alive, and that many prophecies were accomplished in him. Josephus therefore does not say this as expressing his own belief, for he had never known Jesus; but he describes in these words the belief of the Christians, the credibility of which he either did not wish, or was unable to impugn. It should moreover be borne in mind, that Josephus appears not to have adopted the notions respecting the Messiah, which were current among the Jews; nor yet to have exhibited any higher views or hopes respecting any Saviour. If then he did actually esteem Jesus as a σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, as he calls him, whose deeds and fate were remarkable and unusual, he would yet, merely in this view, have no reason for changing his religion.

All the arguments, then, which are urged against the passage under consideration, even if we allow them their fullest force, are yet uncertain; and surely they are not of sufficient weight to weaken the credit of all the manuscripts, and so many of the early fathers; much less to destroy it.

Nor indeed does the opinion, that the passage was inserted by some Christian transcriber, in itself considered, carry with it much appearance of truth. A transcriber of this sort would hardly have been contented with the language as it now stands; he would have introduced more facts respecting the life of Jesus; he would have dwelt with

more prolixity on all the circumstances; and would have noted more particularly his innocence, his resurrection from the dead, his ascension into heaven. We have but to glance at the spurious narratives which were manufactured in the second and third centuries, to rest satisfied that a writer of this sort would not have restrained himself to expressions so moderate as σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, εἶγε ἀνδρὰ αὐτὸν λεγεῖν χεῖρ παραδοξῶν ἐργῶν ποιητῆς καὶ ἀνθρώπων διδασκαλός, *a wise man, if it be proper to call him a man; a doer of wonderful works, a teacher of men, &c.* What unheard of moderation in a writer, desirous of palming upon the world a pious fraud! Can we for a moment suppose that such a writer would merely have said ὁ Χριστός οὗτος ην? or that he would not have more accurately described οἱ πρῶτοι ἄνδρες παρ' ἡμῶν, *those chief men among the Jews*, or οἱ πρῶτον αὐτὸν ἀγαπήσαντες, *those who loved him from the first?*

II. It was manifestly the object of Josephus, to comprise in his narrative all that was memorable in the history of his nation. Is it then probable that he should not have said a word respecting the origin of the order of Christians, who at that time had become numerous, even among the Greeks? Why, I ask, should he adopt such a course? Perhaps through hatred of the Christians, like the rest of his countrymen. This, however, no one will believe, who has read the writings of Josephus; he will not even suspect it. Or perhaps it was through fear of the Jews, lest by narrating the truth, he should give them offence and excite their hatred. If such had been his fear, he ought not to have written at all; much less to have depicted as he has done the perverse obstinacy and depravity of his countrymen. How then can we suppose it possible, that a writer like Josephus, of real diligence, who had treated with considerable copiousness of the life and

death of John the Baptist, (Antiq. xviii. 5. 2.)—how, I say, can we suppose it possible that he should pass over in entire silence a person so remarkable as Jesus, and not bestow a single word on the origin of the sect called Christians, a name which already had become common and well known? Yet unless this passage be genuine, there is no place in the writings of Josephus, where he speaks of the life or character of Christ; and this affords a ground of persuasion in favour of its genuineness.

III. This persuasion is confirmed by the other passage quoted at the head of this article, where mention is made of the death of the brother of Jesus, ὁ λεγόμενος Χριστός. In this latter passage I cannot help believing that Josephus refers to what he had before related respecting this same Jesus. For when he wishes to explain who this James was, who was unknown to Greek readers, he does not call him by his proper name, but gives him the title of *the brother of Jesus who is called Christ*. Josephus has therefore made use of that which was common and well known, in order to explain and describe what was unknown. Suppose now that he had not previously spoken of that Jesus, but had passed over his life and fortunes in silence; how then could he now simply say, Ἰησοῦς ὁ λεγόμενος Χριστός, *Jesus who is called Christ*? I can see no reason to doubt that Josephus took it for granted, that his readers knew and remembered, from what he had already said, who this Jesus was, that was surnamed Christ. For who would suppose that a writer like Josephus would narrate the circumstances of the death of James, a person of far less celebrity, and yet be silent in respect to Jesus? Or who would not deem it a mark of weakness in a writer, that in order more definitely to describe an unknown man, he should introduce the name of another person, whom, although possessed of the highest claims to

notice, he had every where else passed over without the slightest mention?

For the Christian Spectator.

PEOPLE OF COLOUR.

THE many recent movements in behalf of the children of Africa, give strong indications that better times are approaching for that portion of the human family. There are many topics of discussion respecting our own coloured people, which ought to occupy a larger share than they do of the public attention. Every American ought to feel that slavery is the *opprobrium* of the name of liberty. It is "*personal* slavery, in comparison of which," said Mr. Fox, "*political* slavery, much as I hate it, is a bare metaphor." The condition and prospects of the blacks, the conduct, prospects, and duties of the whites, ought to be topics of interesting inquiry to every benevolent mind. The welfare of four millions of people, connected with this subject, and the danger which may finally accrue, even to our free institutions, call for the deep consideration of our statesmen. The heart of the Christian philanthropist is pained when he looks back on the past. His soul sinks within him, as he contemplates the future. The subject is one, which, in my view, requires *immediate* and thorough investigation. This is not only on the ground that slavery is an evil, a great abomination, and one which is continually becoming more dreadful, but the inherent danger is rendered *imminent* by the measures which are going on in the British nation. Their slave population is in the immediate neighbourhood of our own. They speak the same language. The intercourse is easy, constant, and unavoidable.

Measures are begun by which *every slave in the British dominions will soon be free*. The philanthropists who procured the abolition of the slave trade in Great Britain, have formed a "Society for the mi-

tigation, and gradual abolition of slavery, throughout the British dominions. They have acted from a principle of enlightened benevolence; they have taken their resolution, and they will never give over until the thing is accomplished. They have brought the subject before Parliament. The King and Parliament have sanctioned with an *unanimous* voice the principle, "that it is expedient to adopt effectual and decisive measures, for ameliorating the condition of the slave population, and to prepare them for a participation in those civil rights and privileges, which are enjoyed by other classes of his majesty's subjects." When this is accomplished, as it will be, and all the coloured population in the West Indies come to enjoy the "civil rights and privileges of his majesty's other subjects," I ask plainly, what will be the condition of the southern States? Who will say that a war of extermination will not ensue, in which the African cause may excite as much sympathy and as liberal contributions in England and in the West Indies, as the Greek cause has done in this country? Can any man look *calmly* at such a situation?

But no calamity was ever avoided by shutting our eyes. The precipice is none the less steep to him who rushes blindfolded to its brink. Neither is the evil increased by looking it steadily in the face. It is the part of a manly courage, to look at danger calmly, to survey it in all its magnitude, and then to seek for a way of escape. It argues weakness, to stand lamenting over a calamity as inevitable, when we ought to be taking measures to alleviate and remove it.

Our southern brethren are exceedingly unwilling to be reminded of their danger; but it is the part of true kindness, to consult their welfare rather than their feelings. Let the alarm then be continually sounded. *The British slaves will*

soon be free citizens. Destruction awaits us, unless something effectual is done. Something must be done.

The right of personal liberty is not, in all circumstances, an *absolute* right. If it were so, slavery would never have been recognised in the word of God. Yet it was permitted and regulated in the laws given by God himself. Lev. xxv. 44, 45. The only restriction was, that the Jews should not make bond slaves of one another. V. 42. Comp. Exod. xxi. 16. with Deut. xxiv. 7. See Neh. v. 5, 8. Neither has Christianity interfered in this respect to abolish slavery. Paul has given directions for the mutual deportment of masters and servants, or slaves, as they were in those days.*

"By mentioning three several times the slave's subjection to Christ, the apostle mitigated the evils of slavery; for he showed that both the command and the obedience were limited by the law of Christ." *M'Knight.*

Our own laws recognise involuntary servitude, whenever the public good, and the interest of the individual require it. Such is substantially the case of minors, of idiots, of spendthrifts, of drunkards. The right of personal liberty, therefore, is not one which may be lawfully vindicated *at all hazards*. *Salus populi, suprema lex.* The public good, the interest of all classes, both whites and blacks, is *the supreme law*. Slaves have no more an abstract absolute right to rise and kill their masters, and involve the whole community in destruction, than the son or the apprentice has to revolt from the control under which the laws have placed him. The very idea is most preposterous, that a part of the community have a right, which they may assert to the destruction of the peace and happiness of the whole. The right of the master, therefore, to the

* Eph. v. 5—8. 1 Cor. vii. 21—22.

services of his slave, *may be* as perfect, as to the services of his apprentice. But this right depends in either case wholly on the assumed fact, that in existing circumstances the public good requires the existence of servitude. It is a mere creature of society, and is wholly under the control of the laws. The legislature have a perfect right to interfere whenever the public good requires, to modify, or even destroy the relation, and make the slave partially or entirely free. The master's right does not depend at all upon the fact that he has *bought* his slave, or that the slave was born of parents under his control. I quote the words of Mr. Buxton, the gentleman who brought forward the motion on the subject, in the British Parliament. "Here is a certain valuable commodity, and here are two claimants, a white man, and a black man. Now, what is the commodity in dispute? The body of the black man. The white man says, 'it is mine : ' and the black man says, 'it is mine.' Now the question is, if every man had his own, to whom would the black body belong? The claim of the black man to his own body, is just this—nature gave it to him. He holds it by the grant of God. That compound of bone and muscles, is his by the most irreproachable of all titles—a title which admits not what every other species of title admits—a suspicion of violence, or fraud, or irregularity. Will any man suspect, that he played the knave, and purloined his limbs? I do not mean to say, the negro is not a thief; but he must be a very subtle thief indeed, if he stole even so much as his own little finger. At least, you will admit this--the negro has a pretty good *prima facie* claim to his own person. If any man thinks he has a better, the burden of proof is on him. Then we come to the claim of the white man. What is the foundation of your right? You received him from your father. Very good! Your fa-

ther bought him from a trader, at the Kingston slave market: and that trader bought him of a man merchant in Africa. So far you are quite safe! How did the man merchant acquire him? *He stole him!* he kidnapped him! The very root of your claim is robbery, violence, inconceivable wickedness. Your pure title rests on these sacred foundations! If your slave came direct from Africa, your right to him is absolutely nothing. But your claim to the child born in Jamaica, is (if I may use the expression) less still. The new-born infant has done, can have done, nothing to forfeit his right to freedom. And to talk about rights, justice, equity, and law, as connected with slavery, is to talk downright nonsense. But when I say, that the planter has no claim against the slave, I do not say that he has no claim against the British nation." Mr. William Smith, another of the parliamentary orators, said, "As long as we suffer ourselves, or any person or persons connected with us or dependent upon us, to apprehend that it is possible to hold the same unconditional property in their fellow-men, as in any other species of production; until this impious opinion, destructive of all the distinctions which the Almighty has established between man and brute, is so completely removed that not a trace of it shall remain, the march of amelioration in the condition of the negroes will be slow indeed."

I have had three objects in view in thus going into an examination of the nature of slavery, as a legal institution. In the first place, I wish it to appear that the relation between the master and slave is a proper subject of legislation. It is a conventional right, and depends entirely upon the laws. As the laws create it, they may modify, enlarge, restrain, or destroy it, without any other limitation than is imposed by the general good. It is not so much a right of property, as it is a legal

relation; and it ought to be treated as such.

The second object was, to relieve slave-holders from a charge, or an apprehension of criminality, where in fact, there is no offence. There can be no palliation for the conduct of those who first brought the curse of slavery upon poor Africa, and poor America too. But the body of the present generation are not liable to this charge. Posterity are not answerable for the sins of their fathers, unless they approve their deeds. They found the negroes among them, in a degraded state, incapable either of appreciating or enjoying liberty. They have, therefore, nothing to answer for on this score, because they have no other alternative, *at present*, but to keep them in subjection. There is nothing so destructive to the moral sense, as to be forced, by our principles, to the acknowledgment of guilt, in that which we at the same time believe to be absolutely unavoidable, and in which, therefore, it is impossible really to feel self-reproach. Our southern brethren have high ideas of liberty.

There is nothing so calculated to make men restive under command, as a habit and love of commanding others. Upon their own principles, they have been forced to acknowledge even the existence of slavery, in any shape, as criminal. They have therefore concluded that as heavy a curse hung over the present generation for continuing slavery, even when it is plainly unavoidable, as over the last for introducing it. The consequence has been, that those who seriously bewailed the evil, have folded their arms in despair; and those who regarded only their own gratification, expecting to bear the curse at any rate, have taken the desperate resolution, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." But the principle is preposterous, and the conclusion incorrect. A Christian *may*

hold slaves, and exact their services, without any occasion to feel a pang of self-reproach *merely on account* of his holding slaves.

The third object aimed at, was to fasten the charge of criminality on the very spot where such a charge will lie; and where it ought to be felt; and where alone reformation is practicable. There are no duties, without corresponding rights, and no rights without corresponding duties. While it is the duty of the slave to submit himself to his own master, so long as the laws of his country make him a slave, it is his right to be protected, *by the laws*, in the enjoyment of life, health, chastity, good name, and every blessing which he can enjoy consistently with the public welfare. And on the other hand, masters and legislators should feel, that subjection itself, in the best circumstances, is a sufficient calamity; and that the yoke ought to be made as light as possible. Christianity enforces this dictate of sound reason.* "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," is as much the law between master and slave, as between any other members of the human family. This is so obvious, as to appear almost like a truism. And yet this is the very thing that has always been lost sight of, among slave-holders. It has been wholly disregarded, in our own nation. Here is the point to be debated, and settled. This is the ground for fastening the charge upon our whole nation. The law of God requires that all the provision should be made *by law* which the public welfare will admit, for the protection and improvement of coloured subjects, as well as white subjects. *And this has not been done.* We cannot free ourselves from this charge, by pointing to the comfortable mud or even *brick* cabins, the warm jackets and shoes, and the abundance of corn and salt, with which the slaves are furnished.

* See Ep. vi. 5, 9. Col. iii. 22. iv. 1.

We are travelling out of the record, by comparing their situation as regards food and lodging, labour and health, with that of the labouring peasantry in the old despotisms of Europe. We do not answer to this indictment, unless we either plead guilty, or show that our *laws*, our customs, our modes of thinking and acting, recognise the humanity of the negroes. We must show that their rights are acknowledged, their protection secured, their welfare promoted; and that, in every particular, excepting that of involuntary servitude and its *necessary* attendants, they stand upon the same ground with their masters. When this is done, we shall feel no guilt on the subject. We shall fear no divine vengeance. We may hope to enjoy the favour of our merciful heavenly Father. But this is not done. I think I may venture to assert, that in most of the slave-holding states, neither the laws, nor public opinion, secure to the slaves any of the privileges of humanity. Nothing more is done for them, in *kind*, than is done for the domestic beasts; and nothing more in *degree*, except as they are a more valuable species of property, and are recognised, to some extent, as possessing rational faculties. Let the contrary be shown. I say that of all that kind of provision, which goes to purify and elevate the character, and to create in the subject affection and confidence towards the government, every trace and track is completely excluded. The culture of their minds, the preservation of their morals, their instruction in the only religion which can make them good servants, happy neighbours, and hopeful heirs of eternal life, every thing of the kind is guarded against, by the *laws* at least, even more studiously than the abuse of their persons, and the destruction of their lives. Whatever is attempted for their improvement, is done by individual effort, and in direct *violation* of the laws. Here is our

guilt; our full, dark, unmitigated guilt. It is the guilt of our nation. We, in the non-slave-holding states, do not feel it as we ought. But we cannot wash our hands, until we can safely declare, that we have done every thing we can, by public and private efforts, to remove the injustice. We have not done this. Comparatively speaking, nothing has been done. The Colonization Society has indeed made a beginning, and done as well as could be expected. But I ask, how long it will probably be, before that institution can dispose of 30,000 blacks in a year, which is only the *present* annual increase? Until they can do this, the number must be continually increasing. Indeed, I do not believe our southern brethren, in general, intend to do any thing more than to provide a sort of *safety-valve*, by this Society, to serve as an outlet for their free blacks and super-numeraries. In our country, acts of the legislature are to be taken as to the expression of the public feeling, on all great subjects. Towards the blacks, the language of each successive legislature has been, "Our fathers made your yoke heavy, but we will add thereto; our fathers chastised you with whips, but we will chastise you with scorpions." Something must be done, to avert the fearful consequences.

We cannot expect any efficient measures to be adopted spontaneously in the slave-holding states. The natural effects of slavery, upon the morals, industry, population, strength, and elevation of character, of a state, are so destructive, and it produces so much vexation, trouble, and danger; the necessity of it is so very questionable; and its advantages are so trifling, compared with its evils; that we should naturally expect that those who are embarrassed with it would be solicitous about nothing else, than how to be delivered from the curse. But it is not so. The people are so wedded to their habits, and so fond of exer-

cising unlimited power, and so many of their comforts seem to depend upon slavery, that we cease to wonder, at not finding any thing done by them towards improvement. I quote the language of Mr. Clarkson, the great friend of the negroes. "Their prejudices against the slaves are too great to allow them to become either impartial or willing actors in the case. The term *slave* being synonymous according to their estimation and usage, with the term *brute*, they have fixed a stigma upon their negroes, such as we who live in Europe could not have conceived, unless we had irrefragable evidence upon the point. What evils has not this cruel association of terms produced? The West Indian master looks down upon his slave with disdain. He hates the sight of his features, and of his colour; nay, he marks with distinctive opprobrium the very blood in his veins, attaching different names, of more or less infamy to those who have it in them, according to the quantity which they have of it, in consequence of their pedigree, or of their greater or less degree of consanguinity with the whites. Hence the West Indian feels an unwillingness to elevate the condition of the negro, or to do any thing for him as a human being. I have no doubt, that this prejudice has been one of the great causes, why the improvement of our slave population *by law* has been so long retarded; and that the same prejudice will continue to have a similar operation, so long as it shall continue to exist. Not that there are wanting men of humanity among our West Indian legislators. Their humanity is discernible enough when it is to be applied to the *whites*; but such is the system of slavery, and the degradation attached to slavery, that their humanity seems to be lost or gone, when it is to be applied to the *blacks*. Not again that there are wanting men of sense among the same body. They are shrewd and

clever enough in the affairs of life, where they maintain an intercourse with the *whites*; but in their intercourse with the *blacks* their sense appears to be shrivelled and not of its ordinary size. Look at the laws of their own making, as far as the negroes are concerned, and they are a collection of any thing but—wisdom."* If these remarks are not applicable to the slave laws of our own states, let the contrary be shown.

Every attempt at a thorough discussion of this subject has always been met with a cry of *danger*. "You will excite the slaves to insurrection," say they. But I ask if there is now no danger? If every slave owner feels as safe when he goes to bed as if he were surrounded by a free peasantry? If not, what mean those pistols under his pillow, and that loaded rifle over it? And if there is even now no small degree of danger, what will be the case, when the slaves in the West Indies and the Spanish states, become all free citizens? On the subject of danger, I am happy again to avail myself of the language of Mr. Buxton. "I do not mean to say, that there are not very great perils connected with the present state of the West Indies. On the contrary, I am quite sure—as sure as it is possible for any man in the house or in the country to be—that there is imminent peril at the present moment; and that that peril will increase, unless our system be altered. For I know wherever there is oppression, there is danger—wherever there is slavery there is great danger—danger, in proportion to the degree of suffering. But the question is, how that danger is to be avoided. I answer, that it is to be avoided by that spirit of humanity which has avoided it in other places—by doing justice to those whom

* "Thoughts on the necessity of improving the condition of the slaves, &c. with a view to their ultimate emancipation." p. 10, 11.

we now oppress—by giving liberty for slavery, happiness for misery. But even supposing the danger of giving to be as great as the danger of withholding ; there may be danger in moving, and danger in standing still—danger in proceeding, and danger in doing nothing : then, I ask the house, and I ask it seriously—whether it is not better for us to incur peril for justice and humanity, for freedom, and for the sake of giving happiness to millions hitherto oppressed ; or, whether it be better to incur peril for slavery, cruelty, and injustice, for the sake of destroying the happiness of those wretched beings, upon whom we have already showered every species of calamity ? I know there is danger. Danger ! why ? because the few inflict, and the multitude suffer, gross injustice. But I confess it does appear to me to be the most extraordinary of all arguments, to contend that the danger arises not from slavery itself, but from the discussion of slavery in this house. What, then, does the slave require any hint from us that he is a slave, and that slavery is of all conditions the most miserable ? Why, sir, he hears this ; he sees it ; he feels it too, in all around him. He sees his harsh uncompensated labour ; he hears the crack of the whip ; he feels, he writhes under the lash. Does not this betray the secret ? This is no flattery ; these are counsellors which feelingly persuade him what he is. He sees the mother of his children stripped naked before the gang of male negroes, and flogged unmercifully ; he sees his children sent to market to be sold at the best price they will fetch ; he sees in himself, not a man, but a *thing* ; by West Indian law, a *chattel*, an implement of husbandry, a machine to produce sugar, a beast of burden. And will any man tell me, that the negro, with all this staring him in the face, and flashing in his eyes, whether he rises in the morning or goes to bed at

night, never dreams that there is injustice in such treatment, till he sits down to the perusal of an English newspaper, and there learns, to his astonishment, that there are enthusiasts in England, who from the bottom of their hearts deplore, and even more than they deplore, abhor all negro slavery ? There are such enthusiasts ; I am one of them ; and while we breathe, we will never abandon the cause, till that *thing*, that *chattel*, is reinstated in all the privileges of man."

It is of no use now, for any of *us* to declaim about the danger of the discussion. We cannot help it if we would. It is begun out of our reach in the British Parliament, by men who spurn all control but that of Christian principle, and who will continue it, until the enormity of the evil is fully searched out and made known, until the evil itself is fully and for ever destroyed. The thing will be done. It *certainly* will. Look at it a moment. The fact that nothing effectual has hitherto been done *by law* for the mitigation of its evils, warrants us in the supposition that nothing will be done, if those concerned are left to themselves. There seems to be a sort of fatuity about it. Slavery, as it actually exists, and as it will probably always continue while human passions remain the same, is "twice cursed," in him who suffers and in him who inflicts it. We had many exhibitions of its character, during the late ardour in behalf of the Greeks. It would be instructive to take any of the addresses, speeches, or resolutions made on that occasion, and to see how many of the most odious features of Turkish slavery may be fairly matched in this free and enlightened country. Some of them may be rendered stronger in degree, by the ferocity of the Turkish character. And there is some difference in the detail. For instance, there is not the same "uncertainty" to the negro as to the Greek slave, "whether he shall en-

joy the earnings of his own industry; for the black must labour continually, with the full knowledge that he *shall not* enjoy them. He has not even the poor hope of the wretched Greek to animate him in his toils. There are not wanting instances, where masters have held out to their negroes the hope of freedom as an incitement to industry; and then, when the poor slave, by the labour of his nights and holidays, had saved the sum required to buy him free, he has found that "all the earnings of a slave belong to his master," and he is still as far from freedom as ever. The law is so. He has no redress. It may not be so frequent an occurrence as in Turkey, but it is not owing to any *law* that it is not. There is another difference. Says Mr. Webster in his speech, "In the whole world, no such oppression is felt as that which has crushed down the wretched Greeks. In India, to be sure, it is bad enough in principle; but in the actual feeling of oppression, it is not to be compared. There the oppressed natives are themselves as barbarous as their oppressors; but here have been seven millions of civilized, enlightened, Christian men, trampled into the very earth, century after century by a barbarous, pillaging, relentless soldiery. The world has no such misery to show." True, we have only two millions, not "civilized, enlightened, nor Christian." Though living a hundred years in the midst of a "civilized, enlightened, and Christian" land, they are still a barbarous, ignorant, and heathen race, and without any fair prospect of ever being otherwise. However grating to our *feelings* it may be to see "a people of intelligence, ingenuity, refinement, spirit, and enterprise" thus oppressed, I ask if it is not equally abhorrent to our moral *principles*, that a people claiming this character for themselves, should for so many ages act the part of *oppressors*? And that they should

purposely and of design, keep two millions of their fellow-men in the very lowest state of degradation? Who that knows the pleasures of intellectual improvement and refined society, and the delights of domestic happiness, would consent to give them up, even if enjoyed in Turkish bondage? What generous mind would not rather be the Greek than the negro? And so far as the laws have effect, the negro is as absolutely subjected to the caprice of his master, whether actuated by passion or by lust, as the Greek. Public opinion may indeed operate to some extent in the more populous and refined districts, but there is abundant evidence to show, that in many parts of the slave territories, the despotism is exercised as absolutely as in Turkey. Lord Althorpe, in the debate before referred to, said, "The honourable member for Sandwich has stated broadly, and has quoted various documents to prove it, that the slave is perfectly contented and happy. If we look only to the clothing and food allowed to these unfortunate beings, it is enough to convince any reasonable man, without further investigation, of the necessity of an alteration in the present system; and it is idle to the last degree, to talk of the happiness and comfort enjoyed by them. But it is said that some of these happy slaves are so conscious of their bliss, that they have even refused to take advantage of an offer of liberty, and have preferred to live and die in slavery. If the object were to prove the low state to which as moral creatures, these beings have been reduced, nothing could be stronger than this single statement. Good God! can it be imagined for a moment, that a man, possessing the least particle of the sympathies and affections of his species, should prefer to doom himself without remorse, to slavery for life; that he should doom his children after him, from generation to generation, to be born, to live, and die, in the bonds of

slavery; that he should doom for ever his sons to the lash of the slave-driver, and expose his daughters to the will and power of a cruel task-master? If any thing, I say, can raise feelings of indignation and horror in the breast, it would be the knowledge of such a fact as this."

Said Mr. Brougham, on the same occasion, "In Jamaica too, I am told all is perfect; and that the negro, who must be allowed to be the best judge of his own happiness, is perfectly contented with his lot—so well contented that he would not change it. But unfortunately for this assertion, it appears from consulting a single page of the Jamaica gazettes, that it cannot be supported. It is curious to observe the broad and most unequivocal contradiction given by these gazettes to this grave statement of the Jamaica assembly—for it thence appears that many of the negroes have shown a most pointed desire to change their happy situation. In a single page of these gazettes, there are no less than fifty "Runaways,"—persons quitting this enviable situation, not only with a certainty of many privations, but at the risk of all the severe penalties which attach to their crime."

Such are the views and feelings of some of the most enlightened philanthropists in the world. And something will certainly be done in the case. The thought is not to be endured for a moment, that the present state of things should last always. It would seem almost like an imputation upon Divine Providence to believe that he had suffered two millions of his creatures to become so involved in calamity that there was no possibility of a rescue. If God is just, something will be done. It will be done with our consent or against it; by our efforts, or in spite of them. The decree is past, and it hastens to its accomplishment.

It cannot be believed that while all the rest of mankind are advanc-

ing in the march of improvement, two millions of the race, in free America, shall be left in irretrievable degradation. The foundations of rights and duties are becoming known. And have the negroes neither duties nor rights? The Christian sees with delight the efforts that are made to diffuse the gospel of life among the heathen. And shall the negroes be the only heathen? The philanthropist fondly believes that the character of man is rising, swelling, bursting its ancient limits and the bonds with which despotism had sought to confine it. Shall the divine principle remain stationary only among American slaves? Despotic power is gradually yielding to the influence of public opinion. The old monarchies and aristocracies, where the many labour for the few, and government is administered for the benefit of rulers and not of subjects, are trembling and tottering to their fall. Witness the anxiety of the Holy Alliance to repress every thing like revolutionary principles, and every thing that goes to promote general improvement and elevation of character. But they will not be successful. Every friend of freedom feels that they cannot succeed. There is a law of nature against them. An impulse has been given to the minds of men, which is irresistible. And shall the laws of nature be suspended only in the freest country on the globe? Can we believe that God regards slavery here with so favourable an eye, that he will repeal that law by which he has made provision for the renovation of this miserable world?

S. F. D.

To the Editor of the Christian Spectator.

SPECIMENS OF ARABIAN POETRY.

SOME years since, Professor Carlyle, of the University of Cambridge, who was distinguished for his acquaintance with oriental literature, translated and published a

volume of "Specimens of Arabian Poetry;" a second edition of which appeared in 1810. As the book has never been re-printed in this country, I have made up from it a miscellaneous article, which may gratify, perhaps, not merely such of your readers as love variety, but those also who experience a higher satisfaction in knowing how the human mind has thought and felt in a distant age and country, and under the influence of a climate and of customs entirely diverse from our own.

Some of the Specimens are the productions of very early times, but they were chiefly written during the existence of the Khaliphat, a period which has been called the Augustan age of Arabian literature. It will be noticed that, though there is an oriental cast of thought and idiom very visible in them, they are in general free from that extravagance of metaphor and bombast, which we are apt to regard as always characteristic of the oriental style. Every country distinguished for its literature has had its classic age—a point in civilization when its former barbarisms had disappeared, and its fantastic refinements not yet begun; and Arabian literature may claim to be not an exception to this remark.—The poems are sometimes accompanied with notices of their authors. From these I have given a few extracts.

THE SONG OF MAISUNA.

Maisuna was a daughter of the tribe of Calab, of the valleys of Yemen. She was married whilst very young, to the Khaliph Mowiah. But this exalted situation by no means suited the disposition of Maisuna; and amidst all the pomp and splendour of Damascus, she languished for the simple pleasures of her native desert. These feelings she was wont to indulge in the following simple stanzas, which she took great delight in singing, whenever she could find an opportunity to indulge her melancholy in pri-

vate. But being one day unfortunately overheard by Mowiah, who was of course offended at her sentiments, and especially at the contemptuous manner in which himself was alluded to at the close of the song, she was ordered to retire from court. This order she gladly obeyed, and returned to her native Yemen.

The russet suit of camel's hair,
With spirits light, and eye serene,
Is dearer to my bosom far
Than all the trappings of a queen.

The humble tent and murm'ring breeze
That whistles through its flutt'ring walls,
My unaspiring fancy please
Better than tow'rs and splendid halls.

Th' attendant colts that bounding fly,
And frolic by the litter's side,
Are dearer to Maisuna's eye
Than gorgeous mules in all their pride.

The watch-dog's voice, that bays when'er
A stranger seeks his master's cot,
Sounds sweeter in Maisuna's ear,
Than yonder trumpet's long-drawn note.

The rustic youth, unspoilt by art,
Son of my kindred, poor but free,
Will ever to Maisuna's heart
Be dearer, pamper'd fool, than thee.

ON A THUNDER STORM.

By Ibrahim Ben Khiret Abou Isaac.

Bright smiled the morn, till o'er its head
The clouds in thicken'd foldings spread
A robe of sable hue;
Then, gathering round day's golden king,
They stretch'd their wide o'ershadowing wing,
And hid him from our view.

The rain his absent beams deplored,
And, soften'd into weeping, pour'd
Its tears in many a flood;
The lightning laugh'd with horrid glare;
The thunder growl'd in rage; the air
In silent sorrow stood.

VERSES ADDRESSED TO HIS DAUGHTERS,
*By Motummed Ben Abad, Sultan of Seville,
during his imprisonment.*

The occasion of these verses is related by Ebn Khocan, a contemporary writer, in the following words: "Upon a certain festival, during the confinement of Motammed, he was waited upon by his children, who came to receive his blessing, and to offer up their prayers for his welfare. Amongst these, some were females, and their appearance was truly deplorable: they were naturally beautiful as the moon, but from the rags which cov-

ered them, they seemed like the moon under an eclipse; their feet were bare and bleeding, and every trace of their former splendour was completely effaced. At this melancholy spectacle, their unfortunate father gave way to his sorrow in the following verses :

With jocund heart and cheerful brow
I used to hail the festal morn,
How must Motammed greet it now?
A prisoner helpless and forlorn.

While these dear maids in beauty's bloom
With want oppress, with rags o'erspread,
By sordid labours at the loom,
Must earn a poor, precarious bread.

Those feet that never touch'd the ground,
Till musk or camphor strew'd the way,
Now bare and swoll'n with many a wound,
Must struggle through the miry clay.

Those radiant cheeks are veil'd in woe,
A shower descends from every eye,
And not a starting tear can flow.
That wakes not an attending sigh.

Fortune, that whilom own'd my sway,
And bow'd obsequious to my nod,
Now sees me destined to obey,
And bend beneath oppression's rod.

Ye mortals, with success elate,
Who bask in hope's delusive beam,
Attentive view Motammed's fate,
And own that bliss is but a dream.

ON THE VICISSITUDES OF LIFE.

By the Khaliph Radhi Billah.

Radhi Billah, son to Mochtader, was the twentieth Khaliph of the house of Abbas, and the last of these princes that possessed any substantial power. The following poem is rendered peculiarly interesting from the situation of its author, who, if he wanted prudence to foresee, or vigour to extricate himself from his misfortunes, at least appears to have possessed sensibility to feel, and genius to express them.

Mortal joys, however pure,
Soon their turbid source betray;
Mortal bliss, however sure,
Soon must totter and decay.

Ye who now, with footsteps keen,
Range through hope's delusive field,
Tell us what the smiling scene
To your ardent grasp can yield?

Other youths have oft before
Deem'd their joys would never fade,
Till themselves were seen no more,
Swept into oblivion's shade

Who, with health and pleasure gay,
Ere his fragile state could know,
Were not age and pain to say---
Man is but the child of woe?

ON PROCRASTINATION.

By Hebat Allah Ibn Attalmith,

Who, in the midst of Islamism, adhered to a profession of Christianity. He was a great favourite at the court of Bagdad in the time of Al-moktafi, with whom he lived as a friend.

Youth is a drunken noisy hour,
With every folly fraught;
But man, by age's chast'ning pow'r,
Is sober'd into thought.

Then we resolve our faults to shun,
And shape our course anew;
But ere the wise reform's begun,
Life closes on our view.

The travellers thus, who wildly roam,
Or heedlessly delay,
Are left, when they should reach their home,
Benighted on the way.

ON LIFE.

By Shems Almaali Cabus.

Like sheep, we're doom'd to travel o'er
The fated track to all assign'd;
These follow those that went before,
And leave the world to those behind.

As the flock seeks the past'ring shade,
Man presses to the future day;
While death, amidst the tufted glade,
Like the dun robber,* waits his prey.

ON THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF PRIDE AND TRUE GLORY.

By Abou Alola.

Abou Alola is esteemed one of the most excellent of the Arabian poets. He was born blind, or at least lost his sight at a very early age; but this did not deter him from the pursuit of literature. He resided a short time at Bagdad, attending the lectures of the professors at the academy of that city, and conversing with the learned men who resorted thither from all parts of the East. After this he returned to his native cottage, which he never again quitted. But notwithstanding the disadvantages he laboured under, from blindness and want of education, "he lived," according to Abulfeda, "to know that his celebrity spread from the sequestered village which he inhabited, to the utmost confines of the globe." He died in the year 449, aged 86.

Think not, Abdallah, pride and fame
Can ever travel hand in hand;

* The wolf.

With breast opposed, and adverse aim,
On the same narrow path they stand.

Thus youth and age together meet,
And life's divided moments share ;
This can't advance till that retreat,
What's here increased, is lessen'd there.

And thus the falling shades of night
Still struggle with the lucid ray,
And ere they stretch their gloomy flight,
Must win the lengthen'd space from day.

ON THE CAPTURE OF JERUSALEM, IN
THE FIRST CRUSADE.

By *Almodhafer Alabiwerdy*.

The capture of Jerusalem took
place in the 492d year of the Hejra,
A. D. 1099. This event is too well
known to render it necessary to be
dwelt upon ; it was for a long time
a favourite theme with oriental
writers.

From our distended eyeballs flow
A mingled stream of tears and blood ;
No care we feel, nor wish we know,
But who shall pour the largest flood.

But what defence can tears afford ?
What aid supply in this dread hour ?
When, kindled by the sparkling sword,
War's raging flames the land devour.

No more let sleep's seductive charms
Upon your torpid souls be shed ;
A crash like this, such dire alarms,
Might burst the slumbers of the dead.

Think where your dear companions lie—
Survey their fate, and hear their woes,
How some through trackless deserts fly,
Some in the vulture's maw repose ;

While some more wretched still, must
bear

The tauntings of a Christian's tongue—
Hear this—and blush ye not to wear
The silken robe of peace so long ?

Remember what ensanguined showers
The Syrian plains with crimson dyed,
And think how many blooming flowers
In Syrian forts their beauties hide.

Arabian youths ! In such a cause
Can ye the voice of glory slight ?
Warriors of Persia ! can ye pause,
Or fear to mingle in the fight ?

If neither piety nor shame
Your breasts can warm, your souls can
move,
Let emulation's bursting flame
Wake you to vengeance and to love.

ON THE VALE OF BOZAA.

By *Ahmed Ben Yousef Almenazy*.

The intertwining boughs for thee
Have wove, sweet dell, a verdant vest,
And thou in turn shalt give to me
A verdant couch upon thy breast.

To shield me from day's fervid glare,
Thine oaks their fostering arms extend,
As anxious o'er her infant care
I've seen a watchful mother bend.

A brighter cup, a sweeter draught,
I gather from that rill of thine,
Than maddening drunkards ever quaff'd,
Than all the treasures of the vine.

So smooth the pebbles on its shore,
That not a maid can thither stray,
But counts her strings of jewels o'er,
And thinks the pearls have slipped away.

REVIEW OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

An Essay on Faith. By THOMAS ERSKINE, Esq. Advocate : author of "Remarks on the Internal Evidence for the truth of Revealed Religion." Philadelphia, 1823. 18mo. pp. 144.

It speaks well for the interests of religious truth, when the statesman and the advocate devote occasionally their extensive erudition and splendid talents to its illustration and defence. It will not be the least of

their pleasing reflections at the close of life, that they have contributed a portion of the vigour of manhood to aid their fellow-men in obtaining the happiness of the *life to come*, as well as to secure the rights and privileges of the *present* life. With the views we entertain of the importance of divine truth, and of the common interest which men ought to feel in the subject of theology, we shall not allege the charge of impropriety, if

distinguished men in other professions make excursions into the field of theological discussion, even though they should bear away the palm from the professed divine. Revealed truth should find an advocate in every man who regards the highest interests of his fellow-men. We therefore express our gratitude that a writer comes forward to the illustration and defence of divine truth, so well qualified for the task as the author of "Remarks on the Internal Evidence for the truth of Revealed Religion." The subject he has chosen is worthy of his pen. Notwithstanding the light which the wisdom of ages has shed around the subjects of divine revelation, many of them need a further illustration, and a more able defence against the assaults of the designing and the mistakes of the ignorant. Among these subjects, *faith* holds a prominent place. It is of the utmost importance to have correct views of its exercise and object; of its connexion with obedience, with sanctification, justification, and the various Christian graces. We might suppose that the belief of truth, and the practical tendency of that belief were too obvious to be mistaken. But the faith of the gospel is not yet sufficiently understood, if we may judge from the language which we hear on the subject.

Many speak of having "faith to believe" things, that have no existence, perhaps, except in their own imagination, as if truth were created by belief. Some, conscious that their faith is weak, inquire whether it is of the right kind, and make use of language which evidently implies that they do not correctly understand the nature and object of faith. Some rest contented with little more than an assent to the truth of the gospel history. Others disjoin faith from works, and speak of it as if it had no influence in forming the Christian character. Others are undecided whether an unregenerate man can believe the truths of the Scriptures. The Essay which we

are about to recommend to the attention of our readers, is designed to correct some of the errors that have prevailed on the subject of Christian faith, and to give a correct view of its exercise and object. The author's views may be considered somewhat peculiar, but he manifests an experimental acquaintance with his subject, and executes his work in an able manner.

The introductory part, for its pertinence and brevity, we present entire. There is a plainness and directness of manner in commencing a subject, an excellence derived from the bar, which might be profitably imitated in the exordium of sermons.

"We read in the Scriptures, 'that a man is justified by faith, without the deeds of the law,' Rom. iii. 18,—that 'by grace are ye saved through faith,' Eph. ii. 8,—that the glory of the Gospel consists in this, that God's method of justification by faith is revealed in it, Rom. i. 17,—and that 'he that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life, and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life,' St. John iii. 36. And these texts do not appear as insulated observations, nor are they liable to be explained away as figurative expressions, or strong language; they constitute most important parts in the reasoning of the sacred writers, and the general tone of the context is that of sober and unimpassioned argument. We ought not then to wonder, that there should be a very lively and inquisitive interest excited in the minds of those who receive the Scriptures as the inspired word of God, about the precise meaning of the term *faith*. Neither ought we to wonder that many different meanings have been assigned to it. For as faith on the one hand, and unbelief on the other, describe states of mind which appear often to be absolutely involuntary, being the admission of evidence which it is impossible to reject, or the rejection of evidence which it is impossible to admit; men have found it difficult to reconcile their minds to the association of eternal happiness with the one, and of eternal misery with the other, as their just and equitable consequences. To lessen this difficulty, or to remove it, some have supposed that faith was a symbolical

expression for the whole regenerate character, or all virtues; and that unbelief was a symbolical expression for the unregenerate character, or all vices. Others have supposed that faith is one of two necessary conditions of pardon, the other condition being obedience, the absence of either of which made the other nugatory, and effectually excluded from the Divine favour. Others, clearly perceiving that these views could not be reconciled, either with the general tenor of the Bible, or with many most decided and unequivocal texts, have talked disparagingly of holiness and obedience, and have treated of faith as if it were the channel of justification, merely in virtue of an arbitrary appointment of God, and without any reference to its moral effect on the human character." pp. 3—5.

In the observations which the author has to make, he proposes to "point out the sources of some of the errors which have prevailed on this subject, to explain what appears to him to be the correct view of Christian faith, in its exercise and object, and to describe some of its counterfeits." The principal source of error on the subject of faith is justly ascribed to the depravity of the heart. Its influence over belief is happily described, and the remarks on faith being a duty are important.

"Doubtless the great source of error on this subject, is the corruption of the heart. There is a great fallacy in supposing that faith is an involuntary act. The Bible speaks of faith as a duty, and of unbelief as a sin. There are some who object to this language, and prefer calling faith a privilege; and truly it is a most unspeakable privilege. But if 'he who believes not is condemned already, because he believeth not in the name of the only begotten Son of God,' surely unbelief is a sin, and it is our *duty* to avoid this sin; John iii. 18. vi. 28, 29. According to the Bible, then, faith is an act of the will, for *duty* and *sin* imply the action of the will. And our reason speaks in the same way. If the belief of any fact naturally and imperatively calls for the performance of a particular duty, who is the man that will most easily be persuaded of the truth of the fact? He

who takes a pleasure in the performance of the duty, or he who detests it? Have not love and fear, and indolence and interest, very considerable influence over our belief? A surgeon who, in the midst of a tempestuous night, is assailed by a rumour, that a beggar, at the distance of ten miles off, has broken his leg, and claims his assistance, will more readily admit of opposite evidence, than if the circumstances were entirely changed, that is, if the night were day, if the ten miles off were next door, and the beggar a rich nobleman. I do not mean merely to say that he would more willingly go in the one case than in the other, but that his conscientious belief could be more easily engaged in the one case than in the other. He who knew what was in man, after declaring, that 'he who believeth on the Son is not condemned, but he that believeth not is condemned already,' adds immediately, and this is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men have *loved* darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil; thus most explicitly referring belief and unbelief to the state of the heart and affections." pp. 5—7.

What follows is valuable, as it describes the manner in which the deceitfulness of the heart blinds the understanding. Some hints also will be found worth the attention of two classes of professing Christians.

"In the Bible, Christianity is given us as a whole; but men are apt to take confined and partial views of it. Faith is connected in Scripture, both with the pardon of sin and with the deliverance from the power of sin; or in other words, with justification, and sanctification according to common language. In its connexion with justification, it is opposed to merit, and desert, and work of every description; 'It was by faith that it might be 'by grace, or gratuitous, or for nothing,' Rom. iv. 16. Some exclusively take this view, which in itself is correct, but which does not embrace the *whole* truth. Faith, as connected with sanctification, 'purifieth the heart,' 'worketh by love,' and 'overcometh the world,' and produces every thing which is excellent and holy, as may be seen in that bright roll which is given in Heb. xi. Some again are so engrossed with this view of the subject, that they lose sight of the former. This is

a fruitful source of error. In order to understand thoroughly the separate parts of a whole, we must understand their connexion with the other parts, and their specific purpose in relation to the whole. The first of the two classes that have been described, call the other *legalists*, or persons who depend on their own performances for acceptance with God. And they are perhaps right in this accusation;—but they are not aware that they are very possibly guilty of the same offence. They are almost unconsciously very apt to think, that they have paid faith as the price of God's favour. The man who considers faith merely as the channel by which the Divine testimony concerning pardon through the blood of the Lamb is conveyed to his understanding, and operates on his heart, cannot look on faith as a work, because he views it merely as the inlet by which spiritual light enters his soul. Whilst he who considers the declaration, 'he that believeth shall be saved,' as expressing the arbitrary condition on which pardon will be bestowed, without referring to its natural effects on the character, requires to be very much on his guard indeed against a dependence on his faith as a meritorious act. He will not to be sure speak of it in this way, but he runs great risk of feeling about it in this way. And it is not unworthy of observation, that those, whose statements in this respect have been the highest, have often, in their controversies, assumed towards their opponents a tone of bitterness and contempt, most unbecoming the Christian character. This looks like self-righteousness, and seems to mark that they are trusting rather in their own faith, which elevates them, than in the cross of Christ, which would humble them.

In like manner, the second of these classes charge the other with antinomianism, though they themselves are liable to the same charge. They hate the name of antinomianism, and they wish to escape from it, as far as possible, but they mistake the way. They are so much occupied with the Christian character, that they forget the doctrine of free grace, by the influence of which doctrine alone, that character can be formed. They endeavour to become holy by sheer effort. Now this will never do. They can never love God by merely trying to love him, nor can they hate sin by merely trying to hate it.

The belief of the love of God to sinners—and of the evil of sin—as manifested in the cross of Christ, can alone accomplish this change within them. Those who substitute effort for the Gospel, preach antinomianism; because they preach a doctrine which can never, in the nature of things, lead to the fulfilment of the law." pp. 8—11.

Proposing to illustrate these topics more fully in the conclusion of his Essay, the author proceeds to consider, "how, and to what extent, the introduction of scholastic metaphysics into religion, has obscured and perplexed the subject of faith."

"Theological writers have distinguished and described different kinds of faith, as speculative and practical,—historical, saving, and realizing faith. It would be of little consequence what names we gave to faith, or to any thing else, provided these names did not interfere with the distinctness of our ideas of the things to which they are attached; but as we must be sensible that they do very much interfere with these ideas, we ought to be on our guard against any false impressions which may be received from an incorrect use of them. Is it not evident that this way of speaking has a natural tendency to draw the attention away from the *thing to be believed*, and to engage it in a fruitless examination of the *mental operation of believing*? And yet is it not true, that we see and hear of more anxiety amongst religious people, about their faith being of the right kind, than about their believing the right things? A sincere man, who has never questioned the Divine authority of the Scripture, and who can converse and reason well on its doctrines, yet finds perhaps that the state of his mind and the tenor of his life do not agree with the Scripture rule. He is very sensible that there is an error somewhere, but instead of suspecting that there is something in the very essentials of Christian doctrine which he has never yet understood thoroughly, the probability is that he, and his advisers, if he ask advice, come to the conclusion that his faith is of a wrong kind, that it is speculative or historical, and not true saving faith. Of course this conclusion sends him not to the study of the Bible, but to the investigation of his own feelings, or rather of the laws of his own mind. He

leaves that truth which God has revealed and blessed as the medicine of our natures, and bewilders himself in a metaphysical labyrinth.

"The Bible is throughout a practical book, and never, in all the multitude of cases which it sets before us for our instruction, does it suppose it possible for a man to be ignorant, or in doubt whether he really believes or not. It speaks indeed of faith unfeigned, in opposition to a hypocritical pretence—and it speaks of a dead faith when it denies the existence of faith altogether. We deny the existence of benevolence, argues the apostle, when fair words are given instead of good offices; even so we may deny the existence of faith when it produces no fruit, and merely vents itself in professions,—in such a case faith is departed, it is no more, it is dead—there is a carcass to be sure to be seen, but the spirit is gone."—pp. 11—13.

We omit here a digression from the subject, designed to reconcile the apparent discrepancy between James and Paul. We think this might have been accomplished in a much shorter compass. The reader who attentively compares the writings of the two apostles, will perceive that they have different objects, and different errors in view. James describes the practical tendency of faith and the evidence by which its existence is proved. Paul teaches the doctrine of justification by grace through faith, and that we cannot be accepted of God on the ground of our own desert, or by the deeds of the law. But he agrees with James when he calls faith "a believing with the heart unto righteousness." With this view of the subject our author agrees.

The importance of directing the attention to the objects of belief, rather than to the "mental operation of believing," is presented in a clear light; and this topic leads to some interesting remarks on the subject of introducing scholastic metaphysics into religion.

"It is not an easy, because it is not a natural exercise of the mind, to look into itself, and to examine its various susceptibilities, and the mode or law

according to which these are excited by external objects; and whilst we are engaged in this manner, we must necessarily remain to a great degree unaffected by those external objects, which we are using merely as parts of the apparatus required for making the experiment on our own faculties. We must endeavour to be in some degree affected by them, in order that we may observe the mode in which they affect us; but that degree will necessarily be very inconsiderable, in consequence of our attention being chiefly directed towards our own feelings. If I am intent on examining and investigating that pleasing emotion which is produced in the mind by the contemplation of the beauties of nature, it is impossible that I can feel much of that pleasure. I may be surrounded by all that is sublime and all that is lovely in creation—the rising sun may invite my enthusiasm, but Memnon's lyre is silent. I remain untouched, for I am contemplating my own mind, and not the scene before me: and that power unseen, which Akenside describes as '*throned in his bright descending car*,' must attract and absorb the attention, before it can diffuse afar any tenderness of mind. The delightful feeling is produced by contemplating the external object; not by observing nor by knowing *how* we enjoy it. The more thoroughly we are occupied by the object, the more thoroughly will our pleasurable susceptibilities be excited; and the more interrupted and distracted our contemplation of the object is, the more inconsiderable will be the gratification arising from it. We cannot excite the pleasing emotion by mere effort, without the real or imagined presence of its natural exciting object; and whilst we attempt to analyze the origin and progress of the emotion, the object fades from our view, and the sensation dies along with it. Our minds are in this respect like mirrors, and the impressions made on them resemble the images reflected by mirrors. No effort of ours can produce an image in the mirror, independent of its proper corresponding object. When that object is placed before it, the image appears, and when it is withdrawn, the image disappears. And if, in the minuteness of our examination of the image, we look too narrowly in too the mirror, we may find that we have interposed ourselves between the mirror and

soul through the knowledge of this doctrine." p. 34.

We have placed these passages together, for the purpose of giving a kind of definition of what the author considers faith, and to explain the object of the reasoning in the extracts which we shall furnish as our limits may permit.

The part of the work which we are now considering—"the correct view of Christian faith in its exercise and object," commences with the following just description of a true faith.

"A true faith does not properly refer to the mode of believing, but to the object believed. It means the belief of a true thing. As a correct memory does not refer to the process by which the impression is made, but to the accurate representation of the fact remembered. It means the remembrance of a thing as it happened. When, after hearing a person relate incorrectly any history with which we are acquainted, we say, 'he has a bad memory,' we mean merely that he has not remembered what happened. So when we say that a man has a wrong belief of a thing, we ought to mean merely that he does not believe the thing which really happened. The way to correct the memory is not to work with the faculty itself independently of its object, but to attend more minutely and carefully to that object. And this is the only way of correcting the belief too. Were a man, when endeavouring to recollect some circumstance which had escaped him, to direct his attention to the act of recollection rather than to the thing to be remembered, he would infallibly fail in his purpose. In like manner, if he wishes to believe any thing, there can be no more successful way of thwarting his own wish, than by directing his attention to the mental operation of believing, instead of considering the thing to be believed, and the evidence of its truth." pp. 21—23.

The following pages contain an ingenious and satisfactory answer to the important inquiry whether "there is a right and a wrong way of believing the same thing."

"But is there no such thing as a wrong or false way of believing what

is true? Are not the most important truths often believed without producing the slightest effect on the character? Do we not sometimes find men who are prepared to die as martyrs to the truth of a doctrine which never influenced a feeling of their hearts? Let us pick out two of our acquaintances, and let us question them separately as to their religious belief, concerning God and eternity, and their own duties and their own hopes; the answers which they give are in substance the same, and yet their paths in life are diametrically opposite; the life of the one is in harmony with the belief which he professes, the other's is not. They are both incapable of deceit; how then are we to account for this difference, except by supposing that there is a right and a wrong way of believing the same thing? This is certainly a very important question, and it seems to me capable of a very satisfactory solution. Although these two persons use similar language, and appear to believe the same things, yet in reality they differ essentially in the subject-matter of their belief. But this requires farther illustration. We are so much accustomed to satisfy ourselves with vague ideas on the subject of religion, that we are easily deceived by a general resemblance of statements with regard to it; and the word *faith* has been so much withdrawn from common use, and so much devoted to religious purposes, that it has very much lost its real import. To have faith in a thing, to believe a thing, and to understand a thing as a truth, are expressions of the same import. No man can be properly said to believe any thing which is addressed to his thinking faculty, if he does not understand it. Let us suppose a Chinese, who can speak no language but his own, brought before an English jury as a witness. Let him bring with him certificates and testimonials of character which place his truth and integrity above all suspicion. There is not a doubt entertained of him. But he gives his evidence in his own language. I ask, does any one juryman believe him? Certainly not,—it is absolutely impossible—nobody understands a word that he utters. If, during the course of the evidence, the jury were asked whether or not they believed what he was telling them, would they not smile at the question? And yet they know that it is truth.

They *understand* that the witness is an honest man, and they *believe* as far as they understand, but they *can believe* no farther. An interpreter is brought—he translates the evidence; *now* the jury understand it, and their belief accompanies their understanding. If one of the jury had understood Chinese, the difference between his belief and that of the rest, would have been accurately measured, by the difference of their understandings. They all heard the same sounds, and saw the same motions, but there was only one of them, to whom these symbols conveyed any meaning. Now the meaning was the thing of importance to be believed—and the proof of the man's integrity was of consequence merely on account of the authority which it gave to his meaning.

“Faith and reason are so often talked of as not only distinct from, but even opposed to each other, that I feel it of importance to press this point, by farther examples from familiar life. Several merchants receive from their correspondent at a distance, letters recommending them to follow a particular course in their trade, in order to escape a threatening loss, and to ensure a considerable profit. And this advice is accompanied by the information and reasons on which it is founded. The speculation requires a good deal of hardihood, and a most implicit confidence in the information communicated. One of the merchants, on reading his letter, cannot believe that he is in any such danger as is represented to him—he declares the letter a forgery, and throws it into the fire. Another knows the handwriting too well, to doubt of its really coming from the person whose name it bears; but he does not believe its contents, and therefore does not act according to its instructions. A third reads his letter as an essay on mercantile affairs in general, without observing the application of it to his own immediate circumstances, or the call that it makes on him for instantaneous action; and therefore he also is unmoved by it. A fourth acknowledges the signature and the authority of the information, but reads the letter carelessly, and takes up a wrong idea of the course recommended, and sets about a speculation, before he has made himself acquainted with his correspondent's plan; and consequently receives as little benefit from the communication as any

of the former. Now it is quite clear that not one of the four believed the information of their correspondent. Their unbelief is of different kinds, but the result is the same in all. A letter is merely the vehicle of a meaning, and if that meaning is not believed, the letter itself is not believed. The two first understood the meaning of the letter, and rejected it openly and professedly on its own merits. The two last openly and professedly assented to it, but they believed their own interpretation of it, and not the meaning of the writer. It is an absolute absurdity to say that a meaning can be believed without being understood—and therefore nothing which has a meaning can be fully believed until the meaning is understood. When a thing is said or done, of which we don't perceive the meaning, we say, we don't understand that. We are sure that the word has been spoken or the action performed, but we don't apprehend its import. Can we possibly then *believe* that import? In such cases, understanding and belief are one and the same thing. The third and fourth merchants could perhaps both of them repeat their letter by memory; and the third especially, though ignorant, and therefore unbelieving as to its immediate application, could probably talk well of its general principles, and quote Adam Smith in illustration or defence of it. There is a fifth, who reads, acknowledges the signature, understands the contents, believes them, and acts accordingly. This man believes the meaning of his correspondent, and if the information was good, he reaps the full advantage of it.

“In religion there cannot be any cases parallel to that of the second merchant. No man can believe that the Bible was written by God, and at the same time openly profess to disbelieve its contents; and there are not very many who avow their unbelief of the Divine inspiration of the Scriptures. But there are many nominal Christians in situations very closely resembling that of the juryman above mentioned, and of the third and fourth merchants. Are there not many who would be astonished and hurt if their Christianity were doubted, who evidently attach as little meaning to the words *Judgment*, *Eternity*, and *Justification by faith in Christ*, as those men did to the Chinese vocables? Can these be said to be-

the object, and that, instead of the image which we expected, our own face is all that we can discover. I beg the reader to bear in mind, that these observations do not at all interfere with the Christian duty of self-examination, which relates not to the philosophy of the human mind, but to the actual state of the human heart.

"The science of the human mind requires this reflex exertion, because its object is to examine and discover the laws according to which the mind acts, or is acted upon; but Christianity requires no such act, because its object is not to discover the laws according to which the mind is impressed, but actually to make impressions on the mind, by presenting to it, objects fitted and destined for this purpose by Him who made the mind, and fixed its laws. The objects of religion were not revealed to us, to sharpen our faculties, by observing how they were fitted to impress the mind, but that our minds might really be impressed by them with the characters of happiness and holiness. These characters are the subjects of self-examination, and they are all contained in the Divine precepts. Do we love God and our neighbour, and do we give proof of the reality of our love by corresponding action? This is a very different process from that to which I am referring. My object is, to point out the folly of attempting or expecting to make any impressions on our minds by mere effort, instead of bringing them into contact with those objects which God has made known to us in the gospel as the proper means of producing those impressions—and especially to warn against that particular species of this general error, which consists in considering rather *how* we believe than *what* we believe."—pp. 17—21.

The conclusiveness of the reasoning, and the importance of the truths established in this and in the preceding extract, we readily admit, but we are not prepared for the deduction. "From this metaphysical habit of considering and attending to the mind itself, and the mode in which it is impressed, rather than to the objects which make the impression, arose the division of faith into different kinds; and thus the feelings of men were substituted in the place of the tangible word of

revelation." The division of faith into different kinds *might* have originated in the causes assigned, but we have been accustomed to suppose that it has its foundation in the scriptures rather than in scholastic metaphysics. A plain man, who knows not even the meaning of the word metaphysics, we think might find several kinds of faith in his Bible. The belief of certain things accompanied by a miracle, he might very naturally call a miraculous faith, or a faith followed by a miracle. The believing with the heart unto righteousness, as distinguished from a belief in the truth of the gospel history, he might call a realizing, or saving faith. Even the author himself has admitted what may properly be called a speculative faith, for he says that the "external form of moral actions can be believed and talked about when their principle is not at all perceived." And his language implies also that "the outward form of the facts of the Christian history may be believed" in the same manner. That is, a man may believe in the truth of the gospel as a history, without realizing the practical importance of the gospel. We agree, however, with the author, that the introduction of scholastic metaphysics has not proved very beneficial to the science of theology, and that since the age of miracles has passed, the several kinds of faith mentioned in the scriptures, may be included in the faith which has the promise of salvation. Yet the division of faith into several kinds appears to be convenient; and is somewhat important, as it tends to exhibit more clearly the nature of saving faith.

We come now to the most important part of the subject—"the correct view of Christian faith in its exercise and object." And here we have been for some time at a stand, for the purpose of ascertaining the source of a difficulty that retards our progress. After repeatedly examining almost a hundred pages devoted to this division of the sub

ject, we are obliged to confess that either the ideas must be involved in a little obscurity, or our perceptive faculties are somewhat obtuse. The author seems to have anticipated something of the difficulty of which we speak; for in the conclusion of his essay, he very naturally observes, "It may appear to some that I have given rather a complex view of faith." We admit the correctness of this anticipation, and should have admitted it, had the word *obscure* been coupled with "complex." The obscurity—for to us there is an obscurity,—arises principally from the want of unity and method. In the plan of the work, the writer informs us that he shall explain what appears to him to be the correct view of Christian faith, in its exercise and object. This part of the subject comprises three important topics—the *nature*, *exercise*, and *object* of faith. Had the author arranged his arguments and illustrations under these topics, or even had he summed up his arguments at the close, and given us a definition of faith, with a concise view of the subject, he would have prevented some material defects in his otherwise excellent and able performance, and would have saved his readers and ourselves not a little trouble. But in place of this arrangement, so necessary to render perspicuous the particular design of the reasoning, we find a miscellaneous assemblage of topics, arguments, illustrations, and practical remarks, without any apparent specific object; and we are even obliged to go over the whole field to glean a definition of faith. We regret very much that the several interesting topics discussed in this part of the work are not distinctly stated, and that there is such a want of arrangement. The truths are important, but their rays are partially intercepted by a cloud, and they do not converge to a point.

We proceed now to exhibit, as nearly as we can, the author's views

of religious faith, with its exercise and object. The *object* of faith, if we do not misunderstand him, he considers to be the meaning of revealed truth, or the truths of divine revelation correctly understood. Faith itself is the impression on the mind of the reality and importance of these truths—an impression corresponding to the moral qualities of the objects of belief; or, faith implies the possession of those moral feelings to which moral truths are addressed. "In order to a full belief of the gospel, there must be an impression, or conception on the mind, representing every moral quality, and every truth contained and embodied in the facts of the gospel history; for the gospel consists not in the facts, but in the meaning of the facts." p. 47. "Where there are no moral impressions on the mind, there can be no belief on moral subjects; and according to the degree of the impression is the measure of the belief: For in fact, the impression is the belief, and the belief is the impression." p. 39. "My object in this essay has been to withdraw the attention from the act of believing, and to fix it on the object of belief, by showing that we cannot believe any moral fact without entering into its spirit, and meaning, and importance; that we cannot believe in our own danger without apprehension, or in our own deliverance without joy; and that we cannot believe in generous compassion, or self-sacrificing benevolence, without having on our minds at the same time impressions corresponding to these affections; just as we cannot believe in a colour unless we recall to our minds the impression corresponding to that colour." p. 141.—"In order to the believing of the gospel, it is necessary that the plan of justification by faith should be understood; because this is the prominent feature of the gospel, and because the benefits bestowed by the gospel are communicated to the

soul through the knowledge of this doctrine." p. 34.

We have placed these passages together, for the purpose of giving a kind of definition of what the author considers faith, and to explain the object of the reasoning in the extracts which we shall furnish as our limits may permit.

The part of the work which we are now considering—"the correct view of Christian faith in its exercise and object," commences with the following just description of a true faith.

"A true faith does not properly refer to the mode of believing, but to the object believed. It means the belief of a true thing. As a correct memory does not refer to the process by which the impression is made, but to the accurate representation of the fact remembered. It means the remembrance of a thing as it happened. When, after hearing a person relate incorrectly any history with which we are acquainted, we say, "he has a bad memory," we mean merely that he has not remembered what happened. So when we say that a man has a wrong belief of a thing, we ought to mean merely that he does not believe the thing which really happened. The way to correct the memory is not to work with the faculty itself independently of its object, but to attend more minutely and carefully to that object. And this is the only way of correcting the belief too. Were a man, when endeavouring to recollect some circumstance which had escaped him, to direct his attention to the act of recollection rather than to the thing to be remembered, he would infallibly fail in his purpose. In like manner, if he wishes to believe any thing, there can be no more successful way of thwarting his own wish, than by directing his attention to the mental operation of believing, instead of considering the thing to be believed, and the evidence of its truth." pp. 21—23.

The following pages contain an ingenious and satisfactory answer to the important inquiry whether "there is a right and a wrong way of believing the same thing."

"But is there no such thing as a wrong or false way of believing what

is true? Are not the most important truths often believed without producing the slightest effect on the character? Do we not sometimes find men who are prepared to die as martyrs to the truth of a doctrine which never influenced a feeling of their hearts? Let us pick out two of our acquaintances, and let us question them separately as to their religious belief, concerning God and eternity, and their own duties and their own hopes; the answers which they give are in substance the same, and yet their paths in life are diametrically opposite; the life of the one is in harmony with the belief which he professes, the other's is not. They are both incapable of deceit; how then are we to account for this difference, except by supposing that there is a right and a wrong way of believing the same thing? This is certainly a very important question, and it seems to me capable of a very satisfactory solution. Although these two persons use similar language, and appear to believe the same things, yet in reality they differ essentially in the subject-matter of their belief. But this requires farther illustration. We are so much accustomed to satisfy ourselves with vague ideas on the subject of religion, that we are easily deceived by a general resemblance of statements with regard to it; and the word *faith* has been so much withdrawn from common use, and so much devoted to religious purposes, that it has very much lost its real import. To have faith in a thing, to believe a thing, and to understand a thing as a truth, are expressions of the same import. No man can be properly said to believe any thing which is addressed to his thinking faculty, if he does not understand it. Let us suppose a Chinese, who can speak no language but his own, brought before an English jury as a witness. Let him bring with him certificates and testimonials of character which place his truth and integrity above all suspicion. There is not a doubt entertained of him. But he gives his evidence in his own language. I ask, does any one jurymen believe him? Certainly not,—it is absolutely impossible—nobody understands a word that he utters. If, during the course of the evidence, the jury were asked whether or not they believed what he was telling them, would they not smile at the question? And yet they know that it is truth.

They *understand* that the witness is an honest man, and they *believe* as far as they understand, but they *can believe* no farther. An interpreter is brought—he translates the evidence; *now* the jury understand it, and their belief accompanies their understanding. If one of the jury had understood Chinese, the difference between his belief and that of the rest, would have been accurately measured, by the difference of their understandings. They all heard the same sounds, and saw the same motions, but there was only one of them, to whom these symbols conveyed any meaning. Now the meaning was the thing of importance to be believed—and the proof of the man's integrity was of consequence merely on account of the authority which it gave to his meaning.

“Faith and reason are so often talked of as not only distinct from, but even opposed to each other, that I feel it of importance to press this point, by farther examples from familiar life. Several merchants receive from their correspondent at a distance, letters recommending them to follow a particular course in their trade, in order to escape a threatening loss, and to ensure a considerable profit. And this advice is accompanied by the information and reasons on which it is founded. The speculation requires a good deal of hardihood, and a most implicit confidence in the information communicated. One of the merchants, on reading his letter, cannot believe that he is in any such danger as is represented to him—he declares the letter a forgery, and throws it into the fire. Another knows the handwriting too well, to doubt of its really coming from the person whose name it bears; but he does not believe its contents, and therefore does not act according to its instructions. A third reads his letter as an essay on mercantile affairs in general, without observing the application of it to his own immediate circumstances, or the call that it makes on him for instantaneous action; and therefore he also is unmoved by it. A fourth acknowledges the signature and the authority of the information, but reads the letter carelessly, and takes up a wrong idea of the course recommended, and sets about a speculation, before he has made himself acquainted with his correspondent's plan; and consequently receives as little benefit from the communication as any

of the former. Now it is quite clear that not one of the four believed the information of their correspondent. Their unbelief is of different kinds, but the result is the same in all. A letter is merely the vehicle of a meaning, and if that meaning is not believed, the letter itself is not believed. The two first understood the meaning of the letter, and rejected it openly and professedly on its own merits. The two last openly and professedly assented to it, but they believed their own interpretation of it, and not the meaning of the writer. It is an absolute absurdity to say that a meaning can be believed without being understood—and therefore nothing which has a meaning can be fully believed until the meaning is understood. When a thing is said or done, of which we don't perceive the meaning, we say, we don't understand that. We are sure that the word has been spoken or the action performed, but we don't apprehend its import. Can we possibly then *believe* that import? In such cases, understanding and belief are one and the same thing. The third and fourth merchants could perhaps both of them repeat their letter by memory; and the third especially, though ignorant, and therefore unbelieving as to its immediate application, could probably talk well of its general principles, and quote Adam Smith in illustration or defence of it. There is a fifth, who reads, acknowledges the signature, understands the contents, believes them, and acts accordingly. This man believes the meaning of his correspondent, and if the information was good, he reaps the full advantage of it.

“In religion there cannot be any cases parallel to that of the second merchant. No man can believe that the Bible was written by God, and at the same time openly profess to disbelieve its contents; and there are not very many who avow their unbelief of the Divine inspiration of the Scriptures. But there are many nominal Christians in situations very closely resembling that of the juryman abovementioned, and of the third and fourth merchants. Are there not many who would be astonished and hurt if their Christianity were doubted, who evidently attach as little meaning to the words *Judgment*, *Eternity*, and *Justification by faith in Christ*, as those men did to the Chinese vocables? Can these be said to be-

lieve? Are there not many who can speak and reason orthodoxly and logically on the doctrines of the gospel, and yet do not understand the urgency of these doctrines, in application to their own souls? These do not believe the meaning of the gospel surely. And are there not many who, mistaking the whole scope of the Bible, find in it, what is not there, a plan of justification, in which man performs some part, if not the whole, in the work of redemption; or see in it merely a list and a description of duties, by the performance of which, a man may recommend himself to the favour of God? Those who believe this, believe their own vain imagination, and not the gospel. A man who is honest in his belief of that which he professes to believe, is certainly free from the charge of deceit and hypocrisy; but his honesty will not convert a lie into a truth; it cannot make that good news, which is not good news; it cannot change the import of the Bible, or the will of God." pp. 23—30.

In prosecuting the inquiry, whether there can be a wrong or false way of believing what is true, the author remarks, that "no man can be properly said to believe any thing which is addressed to his thinking faculty, if he does not understand it." Upon this point he dwells more at large.

"I may understand many things which I do not believe; but I cannot believe any thing which I do not understand, unless it be something addressed merely to my senses, and not to my thinking faculty. A man may with great propriety say, I understand the Cartesian system of vortices, though I don't believe in it. But it is absolutely impossible for him to believe in that system without knowing what it is. A man may believe in the ability of the maker of a system, without understanding it; but he cannot believe in the system itself, without understanding it. Now there is a meaning in the gospel, and there is declared in it the system of God's dealings with men. This meaning, and this system, must be understood, before we can believe the gospel. We are not called on to believe the Bible merely that we may give a proof of our willingness to submit in all things to God's authority,

but that we may be influenced by the objects of our belief." pp. 31, 32.

It is admitted that we may understand many things which we do not believe, but the opposite of this proposition needs to be stated in a more guarded manner. We entertain no doubt respecting the correctness of the author's religious sentiments, but we think he has unhappily, and unconsciously given countenance to the dangerous and too prevalent doctrine, that in religion nothing is to be admitted which is incomprehensible. His language assumes the form of this general proposition: *We can believe nothing that we do not understand.* It is undoubtedly true that we cannot, strictly speaking, believe any thing which is unintelligible; but in admitting this we do not grant that incomprehensible truths are in *no sense* objects of belief. The union of the soul and body, for instance, is an object of belief, although we cannot understand the *nature* or *mode* of this union. In the same manner we must believe in the mysteries of the gospel, although we cannot understand these mysteries. When the author therefore informs us, that "in order to a full belief of the gospel, there must be an impression on the mind representing every moral quality, and every truth contained and embodied in the facts of the gospel history," and that "we cannot believe any thing addressed to the thinking faculty which we do not understand;" he should have guarded these broad declarations against mistake. It is impossible that all the truths which relate to the character of God, and the plan of redemption should be impressed on the mind, for they are to us incomprehensible; and it would therefore be easy to draw the inference from the author's unqualified positions, that religion in the inadmissible sense of the word is altogether *rational*; that is, the subjects of revelation must be brought whol-

ly within the grasp of our limited faculties. This sentiment we are confident the writer of the essay would by no means justify ; and we presume therefore that on reviewing this part of his work he would qualify the propositions alluded to somewhat in this manner :—although it is strictly true that we cannot believe any thing which is unintelligible, yet we admit that the scriptures speak of incomprehensible truths, and these truths are in some sense objects of faith, although we cannot understand them. We believe for instance that God is a spirit ; that he is eternal, and omnipresent ; but, strictly speaking, is it correct to say that we must understand the ‘meaning’ of these terms before we can believe in the attributes signified by them ? Our very attempts at a definition of the words ‘spirit,’ ‘eternal,’ ‘omnipresent,’ would seem to furnish proof that we feel the truths which they represent to be incomprehensible, while at the same time we regard these truths as proper subjects of belief. We find the same need of qualifying the sentiment contained in the following extracts—that the degree of faith is accurately measured by the degree of knowledge. By a little perversion of this doctrine we should become Gnosticks. There is nothing to save us from this error but the vulnerable position, that we cannot believe, or understand the truths of the Bible, without corresponding affections. There should be a broader line of distinction between the disciples of Christ, and the followers of Simon Magus.*

“What is the difference between knowledge or understanding, and faith ? Our understanding of a thing means the conception which we have formed of it, or the impression which it has made on our mind, without any reference to its being a reality in nature

* Author of the heresy of the Gnosticks, who taught that men, however vicious their practice was, should be saved by their knowledge.

independent of our thought, or a mere fiction of the imagination : And faith is a persuasion, accompanying these impressions, that the objects which produced them are realities in nature, independent of our thought or perception. This persuasion of reality accompanies all the different modes in which our knowledge is acquired, as well as the testimony of others. When an object is presented to my eye, the impression which it makes upon me is accompanied by the persuasion, that the object which produced it is truly described by the impression which it has made, and that it is a reality independent of myself. When a proposition in mathematics is demonstrated to me, a persuasion accompanies my understanding of it, that these relations of quantities are fixed and unalterable, and altogether independent of my reasoning. When the generous or kind conduct of a friend meets my difficulties, my impression of the fact is accompanied by a persuasion of the reality of that generosity or kindness, as qualities existing in my friend’s heart, altogether independent of my thought or feeling on the subject. When I hear through a channel which appears to me authentic, of some melancholy or some joyful event, there is an accompanying persuasion that there is a real cause for joy or sorrow.

Faith, then, is just an appendage to those faculties of the mind by which we receive impressions from external objects, whether they be material or immaterial. It stands at the entrances of the mind, as it were, and passes sentence on the authenticity of all information which goes in. Now as faith is merely an appendage to another faculty, is it not evident that its existence and exercise, with regard to any particular object, must depend on the existence and exercise of that faculty to which the object is addressed ? A man born blind has no impressions from light, and therefore he can have no faith with regard to such impressions. He has not the slightest conception of what is meant by a coloured body, and therefore he cannot believe in a coloured body. He may believe that bodies have a quality which he is incapable of perceiving, but what that quality is he does not know, and therefore cannot believe in it. Faith is the persuasion that the impression on the mind was produced by a real object.

But if no *impression* is made upon the mind, what room is there for the exercise of belief? If he, like another blind man, has formed an idea that red is like the sound of a trumpet, the impression is a false one, and the belief appended to it is also false, that is, it is appended to a false impression. For faith must always derive its character from the impression to which it is appended.

"If the impression is correct, the faith is correct; and if the impression is incorrect, the faith is incorrect. And when we are considering impressions as produced by objects supposed or known to be real, we may very properly explain faith to be the impression made on our minds by some such object." pp. 34—37.

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"Where there are no moral impressions on the mind, there can be no belief on moral subjects; and according to the degree of the impression is the measure of the belief: For, in fact, the impression is the belief, and the belief is the impression.

"In illustration of this, let us suppose two men travelling together whose minds are differently constituted. One has the ordinary degree of alarm at the idea of death; the other is entirely devoid of any such feeling. They come into a situation in which their lives are endangered. A stranger passing by, interposes between them and the danger, and saves their lives, but at the expense of his own. Our two travellers have both of them the use of their eyes and their ears, they have both of them seen and heard precisely the same things, and when they tell their story, their two narratives agree most minutely: And yet they believe two essentially different things. The one believes that the disinterested and heroic generosity of a stranger has saved them from what he cannot but consider as a dark and awful fate. In consequence of this, he rejoices in his safety as far as his sorrow for his noble benefactor will permit—he feels himself laid under the most sacred obligation to reverence the memory of this benefactor, and to repay to his surviving friends or family that debt of gratitude which he owes for his deliverance. The other understands nothing, and consequently believes nothing of all this—he saw no evil in the death with

which they were threatened, and of course no generosity in him who rescued them from it by encountering it himself—he neither feels joy, nor sorrow, nor gratitude, excited by any part of the history. These two men do not believe the same thing in two different ways; they in fact believe two different things. Examine the two impressions. They may be compared to the traces left by the same intaglio on two different substances—the one substance too solid to yield to the pressure, or receive the mould of the sculpture, exhibits nothing perhaps but the oval outline of the stone—whilst the other, possessing the right consistency, and coming in contact with every portion of the substance, receives and retains its perfect image, and exhibits, it may be, lineaments which express all that mind can grasp in thought or feel in tenderness. The mind of the one traveller has come in contact with every part of the action, and bears away accordingly the impression of the whole; the mind of the other was incapable of coming in contact with the whole, and of course has received a most imperfect and partial impression. We can only know the qualities of things by corresponding susceptibilities in our own minds. The absence of the susceptibility of fear absolutely incapacitated our traveller for understanding danger, and consequently for comprehending the generosity of the stranger's interference, or for perceiving that there was any thing joyful in his own deliverance. The actions of men are not to be considered as mere external shells, or dead carcasses—they in so far resemble those who act them, that they have a spirit and internal life, as well as an outward form—and that this spirit constitutes their character. Of course then we do not understand nor believe a moral action, whilst we do not enter into its spirit and meaning: and we can only enter into the quality of its spirit, through the excitement of the corresponding susceptibilities of our own minds. In morals, we really know only what we feel. We may talk about feelings which we never experienced, and perhaps even correctly enough; but it is just as a blind philosopher may talk about colours." pp. 39—42.

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"We see then, that the impression

which any object makes on our minds, whatever that impression may be, sums up and defines our knowledge and belief of that object. We ought then to guard against being deceived by names. A number of men may receive impressions from the same object, and all these impressions may be different, and yet each of them will give to his own impression the common name of the object which produced it. An indifferent hearer may, when he listens to their story, suppose that they all know and believe the same thing; but a judicious and curious questioner might discover from their own mouths, that amongst the whole, there are not two impressions alike. Compare, by way of a broad instance, the belief of a moss-rose entertained by a blind man—a man without the sense of smell—and a man in the full exercise of his external senses. There are evidently three different impressions made on these three minds, that is, there are three different beliefs; and yet there is but one name given to the three, and that is, the name of the object, to which they all refer.

“Every object is composed of many parts and qualities, but all these subdivisions are summed up in the name given to the object which is their aggregate, and he who uses the general name is presumed to imply all the parts belonging to it. Thus a pillar of a hundred feet in height is talked of as if it were one and indivisible, whereas it consists of an infinite number of parts, the existence of each of which may be a distinct subject of knowledge and belief. A blind man who runs against it, knows and believes in a few square feet of it; but he does not believe in the remaining feet, for he has received no impression from them. After he is informed of the dimensions of the pillar, he believes in a quite different thing from what he did before; or rather perhaps, to speak more correctly, he believes in a number of things which he could not believe in before, because his mind had not come in contact with them.” pp. 43—45.

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“If the Gospel contains tidings of deliverance for persons in our circumstances, we do not understand it, unless there be on our minds, the corresponding impression of joy.

“If this interposition on our behalf

proceeded from holy love, on the part of God; we cannot understand the nature of the gospel, unless we know both what holiness and love mean; and this we cannot know by mere description. We must have on our minds impressions corresponding to holiness and love, before we can believe in holy love. Had we no affections, the gospel would be in vain proclaimed to us, because it is addressed to the affections, and without them we could not understand it. And when they are unexercised upon it, it comes to the same thing as if we were without them.” p. 49.

It is a cause of regret that so many unguarded expressions occur in so excellent a work.—“Had we no affections, the gospel would be in vain proclaimed to us, because it is addressed to the affections, and without them we could not understand it.” But are not some parts of the gospel addressed to the *understanding*, and could not these parts be understood on the supposition that the mind was mere intellect? But according to the author's view of faith, we can neither understand nor believe the gospel without affections corresponding to its truth. “And when the affections are unexercised upon the gospel, it comes to the same thing as if we were without them.” In what sense then can an unregenerate man believe the gospel? He exercises no holy affections, for he does not possess them; consequently he cannot understand or believe the gospel, any more than if he had no affections. The author proceeds to prove, by further argumentation, that “a belief of the gospel comprehends not only the impressions corresponding to the external facts of the history, but also the impressions which correspond to all the moral qualities and conditions therein attributed to God and man.” In the following passage, however, he seems to be rather at variance with the general principle he has laid down respecting the understanding and belief of moral truth.

“Conscience gives us an idea of sin, and the idea of sin enables us, in some

measure, to form a conception of its opposite, holiness. The corruption of man does not consist in his acquiring wrong faculties, nor does the renewal of man consist in his having new faculties bestowed on him. His corruption consists in the misdirection of his faculties, and his renewal consists in their being directed to their proper objects. Holiness consists in this right direction of the thoughts and affections, in a love for their proper objects, and a distaste for their wrong objects. Man, in his depravity, has all the faculties which a child of God has, in this life. And he has a natural ability to use these faculties as he will. The inability, therefore, of a polluted creature to receive an impression of holy love, is not a natural inability; if he would, he could; his inability is moral; it lies in the opposition of his will and affections, and this is his crime. But whatever the cause of pollution may be, and whether the impossibility be natural or moral, a polluted heart cannot receive an impression of holy love. How then does the gospel enter the heart; for are not all hearts polluted? Yes; but there is a Divine and Almighty agent, who opens the eyes of the understanding, and prepares the affections to receive the truth, even the Holy Spirit, who takes of the things that are Christ's, and shows them unto the souls of men. And there is also a wonderful adaptation apparent in the gospel itself to the heart of man in every condition. Its first address is to the very elements of our nature, to that instinct which seems common to us and the inferior animals,—self-preservation, and the desire of happiness." pp. 53, 54.

Now if "the idea of sin enables us in some measure to form a conception of its opposite, holiness," it follows that we may have *some* knowledge of holiness without the exercise of holy affections, or without the corresponding impression of holy love; and therefore we may believe in holiness without being holy. And yet "we must have on our minds, impressions corresponding to holiness and love, before we can believe in holy love." We see no way of avoiding the conclusion that there is a clashing of arguments here, unless it can be proved that

we may "in some measure form a conception of holiness," without knowing what it is, and without believing in it. If, as it respects the existence of belief, there is a necessary distinction between forming a conception of holiness, and having on the mind an impression corresponding to holiness, this distinction is too tenuous for the apprehension of common minds.

To be continued.

*Reply to the Christian Examiner.**

Continued.

To the Editor of the Christian Examiner.

SIR,

IN a preceding letter, I have stated several things in the review of my sermon, which I consider as a departure from the equitable rules of argumentation. It has appeared to me, that no correct general view is given of the entire argument, and that generally, no logical statement is given of the particular arguments and facts relied on, and that the arguments alluded to are evaded and misrepresented by a reply that assumes a position which the argument does not include; and that the review is calculated to have the effect of appearing to answer an argument which it does not touch, and at the same time of creating such a prejudice against the sermon, as will prevent its being read. Whether these complaints are well founded, or only the result of my own unreasonable partiality, it will be my object in this letter to enable you and the public to judge.

The arguments omitted entirely are the *second* and the *fifth*: they

* We insert a note here for the purpose of correcting a mistake sooner than it could be done in an erratum at the end. The article on the Trinity, p. 101, last number, should not have been incorporated with the "Unitarian Creed," it not being a distinctive article between Calvinists and anti-calvinists. In quoting the epitome from the Sermon, the article in question was accidentally omitted to be marked out. In each of the articles, the words following "Unitarians believe," should have been marked as a quotation.

are short and obvious to popular apprehension, and profess to rest on the testimony of the Bible, and if fallacious, might have been easily answered. The first, stated concisely, stands thus: According to the Bible, the righteous love the truth and the wicked hate it;—according to the Bible, the irreligious, and profane, and immoral, and ambitious, and voluptuous are *the wicked*,—and it is notorious that this class of persons do, as a general fact, prefer the Liberal system, and are vehement in their opposition to the Evangelical system. We hope the reviewer will take notice of this argument the next time.

The other argument omitted respects the identity of the faith of the primitive martyrs, and of those who suffered under the papacy. The first are declared to have been slain for the word of God and the testimony of Jesus. But with reference to those who suffered afterwards under papal persecutions, it is said also, here is the patience of the saints. Here are they that keep the commandments of God, and the faith of Jesus. The faith of the martyrs then, under pagan and papal Rome, was the same. But the faith of the martyrs under the papacy was evangelical. It embodied the doctrines of the reformation. Of course these are the same with the faith of the primitive martyrs, and their faith is the word of God, and the testimony of Jesus. It is my request also, that this argument may receive the attention which it may seem to require.

Under the general argument concerning the identity of the effects produced by the gospel, and by the evangelical system, one particular argument, of no small consequence, is also passed over in silence. It is the fact that both the gospel and the evangelical system are virulently opposed by such persons, and in such circumstances, as show that the opposition does not proceed from the love of truth and aversion to

error. For the facts, I must refer to the paragraph in the sermon, p. 13. The reviewer is requested to take this argument also into serious consideration.

The evasions and misrepresentations of my argument are as follows:

Evasion 1. This has respect to my argument derived from the direct and obvious import of the Bible. In logical form it stands thus: The Bible was given for the use of the common people, the great body of the human family. To be understood by the common people, the true import must be that which corresponds with the direct and obvious import of the terms as they are understood in popular use. But the doctrines of the evangelical system are in accordance with the most direct and obvious meaning of the sacred text; therefore they are the doctrines of the Bible, the real faith which was delivered to the saints. This argument the reviewer evades and misrepresents by answering it, as if my position had been that the doctrines of the evangelical system, are in accordance with the *literal* import of the sacred text,—substituting *literal* for *obvious*, as if they were synonymous terms. But I have not said that the doctrines of the evangelical system are in accordance with the *literal* import of the sacred text, and I cannot but believe that the reviewer knows that *obvious import* and *literal import* are not synonymous terms. Why then does he wander away from the argument into a dissertation upon figurative language, to disprove what I have not asserted? Will the reviewer undertake to show that the import of figurative language is not, as a general fact, obvious to popular apprehension? Why then is it used by inspired writers? And why used at all by any writers, whose object it is to be understood? Is it the object of a revelation to conceal the truth, or to make it manifest? Is there no meaning in the poetry of the Bible obvious to

popular apprehension? Are Homer, Virgil, and Milton, unintelligible, because, under the influence of a powerful imagination, they speak in figures? Do not the eastern nations understand their highly figurative writers? Or the aboriginals of our land, their eloquent orators? Figurative language, instead of being unintelligible, is peculiarly the language of the common people, and of the early stages of society. Figures are the hieroglyphics of nature, known and read of all men; and if they are sometimes obscure, this is no more than is true of literal language; and if they are sometimes borrowed from scenery or customs not familiar to our eyes, these allusions have been so often explained by commentators, which the common people read, and from the pulpit also, that the greater part understand their import well. Multitudes who are not learned in the original languages, have read history and geography, and have studied English grammar and rhetoric; and there are few who do not understand that there were fig-trees, and vines, and hills, and valleys, and shepherds, and flocks in Palestine; and that springs of water were scarce in the deserts of Arabia; and that green pastures, and still waters, and the shadow of a great rock, were peculiarly refreshing in a weary land; or who have not been told, and do not believe, that Egypt was watered by the Nile, instead of showers of rain. Nor is it true, so far as my observation extends, that the common people are misled as to the doctrines or duties of the Bible, by the obscurity of figurative language. They do not suppose that the Sun is God, because it is said the Lord God is a Sun; or that God is material, and clothed with human passions, because he is spoken of as having a hand and a mouth, and as the subject of anger, and grief, and repentance. If in some instances they do not understand local allusions, and cannot give a learned dissertation

upon metaphors, and hyperboles, and oriental customs; they do nevertheless, in most instances understand truly the general import of the figurative language of the Bible. Common sense, and common honesty, united with diligence and prayer, seldom lead the common people astray in respect to doctrine. So plain is the Bible, that but for the aid of learned writers, they would seldom go astray. The very rules of exposition are only the operations of common sense in the composition of language, observed and noted by learned men. There were poets before the rules of poetical composition were embodied; and orators before the rules of elocution were reduced to system; and expositors of the Bible, before exposition became a science, guided by general laws.

Again: His reply, p. 55, represents my position as being, that the obvious sense of the proof texts is evangelical, taken separate from their connexion, and goes on to throw back upon me a powerful declamation about Quakers, and Baptists, and Antinomians, and Catholics, and Universalists, as all claiming and having the obvious sense of proof texts in their favour, 'if you take them separate from their connexion.' But this is a direct misrepresentation, both of my language and meaning. I have not said nor implied that the doctrines of the evangelical system are in accordance with the direct and obvious import of the sacred text, "taken separate from its connexion." It is easy to reply to the argument of an opponent, if we may first alter his propositions, and reply to propositions modified to suit our own convenience.

Again: The reviewer says, "When we speak of the obvious sense, as being probably the true sense of any passage, we mean the obvious sense as it struck the mind of the writer, and not as it may happen to strike our minds." I had

always supposed that the obvious meaning of a writer, is that which is actually communicated to the minds of the reader by his language, interpreted according to its import in common use ; while the real meaning of a writer, is that which was present to his mind, and in his intention when he wrote. But how the real can be called the obvious meaning of a writer, when it is not communicated by the terms he employs as the signs of his ideas, it is not easy to understand. And if erring men, as doubtless some have done, may write one thing and mean another, it is not so easy to reconcile it with the wisdom or the goodness of God, that men inspired to give a revelation of Christian duties and doctrines, should have one meaning present to their minds, and communicate to their readers an entirely different meaning. If the real and the obvious import of the Bible be not the same, the common people, as I should think, have no Bible, and infidels have the best of the argument, who claim that no revelation has been made. But perhaps the reviewer will claim that he ought to be understood to mean, that the real and the obvious meanings of the inspired writers, were the same to their cotemporaries ; but that what is to us now the obvious import of their language, is not the real import of the Apostles, nor that which was understood by those of their day. For he says, "Such have been the changes that have taken place in the customs and manners of the world, in the modes of thinking and speaking that have prevailed, in the controversies that have been carried on in the church, and especially in the peculiar, and, as it were, *technical* meaning of some of the leading terms used in those controversies, that even in those passages where the sacred writers intended to be understood in the obvious import of the language used, what was the obvious import to them, may appear a forced and most

unnatural construction to us, from the necessary changes which language has undergone. This holds true especially of those who are under the necessity of reading the Bible in a translation, and as in the case of our translation, in a language remarkably different from the original, in many of its characteristics. That the sacred writers were, for the most part, unlettered men, (a circumstance alluded to by Dr. Beecher,) only serves to heighten this difficulty, as they must have been so much the more likely to use language in its *local* and *peculiar* sense, rather than in its general, precise, and philosophical sense. Add to this, the effect which a man's theological prejudices and prepossessions must have upon his mind, in judging of the obvious import of many passages of scripture. If he has been trained to associate inseparably a peculiar theological sense to certain words of frequent recurrence in the sacred writings, (such for example as *grace*, *election*, *justification*, &c.) it will follow of course that many of the passages, in which these words are found, will suggest to him a meaning, and it will seem to him their *obvious* meaning, though widely different from their true meaning, and indeed, from their obvious meaning to all unprejudiced readers."

I must here protest against the reviewer's coming over to my side without striking his colours, and with all the tokens of continued opposition, leading the incautious reader to conclude that I must be wrong because the reviewer reasons conclusively. I had said that if the obvious import of revelation is not the true import, the common people have no Bible. This conclusion the reviewer calls indecent and irreverent, and with all his might is assisting me to establish the truth of the conclusion. For what other purpose has he gathered around the sacred text the clouds and darkness of changes, and manners, and modes

of thinking, and controversies, and technical meanings, and translations, and prejudices; or to what other conclusion do they tend but to prove that the common people have no Bible? Tindal has quoted all these difficulties, and many more, from Bishop Taylor, to prove that a true exposition of the Bible is utterly a hopeless thing; that the Bible is a book of no use, and that men can safely rely only on reason and the religion of nature. The Papists have alleged the same difficulties to prove that the Bible can be of no use to the common people, and ought to be taken from them as a book which would lead them astray. And Socinians have borrowed from Infidels and Papists these hackneyed objections, which have been answered, and still repeated beyond the thousandth time, to mitigate the criminality of doctrinal error, and invest reason with a sort of dictatorship in deciding the import of the sacred text. And the conclusion to which Bishop Taylor himself comes, is, that "these and a thousand more difficulties have made it impossible for a man in so great a variety of matter, not to be deceived." I have stated hypothetically, that if the obvious import of the Bible, according to the meaning of the language in common use, is not the true import, the common people have no Bible; and Tindal and the Pope, and Bishop Taylor and the reviewer, all seem to say that the meaning obvious to the common people is not the meaning which was present to the minds of the inspired writers,—a conclusion which the reviewer calls indecent and irreverent, and in which I entirely agree with him. But does the reviewer really intend to renounce translation as impossible, and turn us over to reason and the light of nature? And if he does not intend this, what does he intend? I have long been offended with the flippant style in which Unitarians have dealt out these Infidel and Popish objections against the Bible,

to dim the atmosphere of common vision, and gather doubts about the sacred book;—and a better service can scarcely be rendered to the cause of Christianity, than to shed daylight upon the fog, and drive it away. What then, as the metaphysician said of a poem,—what do all these difficulties prove? They prove that the common people cannot translate the Bible from the original languages;—but do they prove that learned men cannot translate the Bible? It is certainly a difficult work, putting in requisition intellect, learning, judgment, candour, application, piety, and prayer; but is it, with these qualifications, impossible? Have such changes in manners and customs happened since the Bible was written, as have thrown a fatal eclipse on the human mind? Have the Greek and Latin classics perished, and are all their beauties, thoughts which they never knew, supplied by the genius of modern men? But if profane authors may be understood by the learned, why may not the Bible be understood? Have all the effects of time fallen exclusively upon the word of life, while the follies and impurities of heathen mythology have come down to us correctly translated? The Bible can be understood by men acquainted with the language in which it was written. No changes have happened which have sealed up that holy book, or thrown darkness and doubt upon its illuminated pages. What then, do these difficulties prove? Do they prove that, when learned men have ascertained the meaning of the Bible, they cannot clothe it in language obvious to popular apprehension? If they cannot, the common people have no Bible, and if they can, all this talk about changes of customs and manners, &c. is like the smoke which vanquished warriors create to conceal their retreat. Why cannot the meaning of the Bible be made intelligible to the common people, in other languages?

It may be made intelligible. It has been, and there is one fact that proves it. It is the fact that all men understand or misunderstand the proof-texts concerning doctrine alike. There is none, among all the translations, exclusively Calvinistic, or Arminian, or Unitarian. In all versions, as the reviewer says, all have their respective proof-texts, and all the texts relied on by each are the same in all versions. A Calvinistic proof-text in our version, is a Calvinistic proof-text in every other version; which shows that whoever may be wrong, the Bible is correctly translated. What then do these difficulties, so much vaunted by Unitarians, prove? They prove that no translation is absolutely perfect in every possible respect. But what if it be so—that no translation is exact? Does it follow that every translation is not so far exact as to communicate, in a manner obvious to popular apprehension, the entire mind of the Spirit on the subject of doctrine? A writer may spell badly, and write ungrammatically, and yet be understood. There may be thirty thousand various readings, and not one of them obscure the flood of light which is poured on all the doctrines of the Bible. It may not be difficult perhaps, to show that, on some passages, clouds and darkness rest to this day. But does the eclipse of one star hide the light of all the rest, and blot out the sun? What if some points of chronology are matters of doubtful disputation—do these obscure the law of God, or the revealed account of human depravity, or the doctrine of regeneration, or the nature and necessity of repentance and faith? Some of the prophecies are obscure, as they were designed to be, until the hand of time should lift the veil. But what has prophetic obscurity to do with the doctrines of the Bible, whose object it is to instruct, and which are of no use, except as they are made intelligible? And if the changes through which the Bi-

ble has passed, have thrown obscurity and doubt on some passages which relate to doctrine, are all the proof-texts, or all the doctrines, to be rejected as incompetent witnesses, and thrown into a dungeon? If some of the figures which are employed to teach doctrine, are not intelligible from local allusions, is the light of all figures, therefore, put under a bushel? And what if the light of every metaphor in the Bible were put out—is the Bible all metaphor? Are not the doctrines still revealed so plainly in literal language, as to render the belief of them a duty, and the disbelief of them a sin? And as to prejudice, I hope the reviewer will not advocate the maxim that a man may avail himself of his own crime, or that the Bible is not obvious to honest minds, because it presents a darkened page to those that hate the light, neither come to the light, lest their deeds should be reprov'd. It was for the blindness of prejudice, that the Jews were blinded more, and for that darkness of the understanding which was caused by the heart, that they were hardened more, and given over to believe a lie. And as to controversies and different opinions, it remains to be proved that these have resulted from any obscurity of the Bible concerning doctrine, and have not resulted rather from pride, and passion, and selfishness, and ignorance, and enmity against God. The Bible may be a plain book to any man who will do the will of God; while to the wicked, who will do wickedly, it may remain a sealed book. I am aware that just opinions are made neither better nor more true by authority, and yet the concurrence of human opinion upon a given subject, increases the presumptive evidence of its truth. In this view I quote with satisfaction the testimony of Locke. Speaking of the Bible, he calls it a collection of writings designed by God for the instruction of the illiterate bulk of

mankind in the way of salvation, and therefore generally, and in necessary points, to be understood in the plain, direct meaning of the words and phrases, such as they may be supposed to have had in the mouths of the speakers who used them. The Christian Examiner for May and June 1824, in an article entitled "Notes on the Bible," says, "Had the copies of the New Testament which have come down to us, in their transmission through successive centuries, and versions from one language to another, suffered changes of such a nature as to render it uncertain what were the facts and events originally narrated, what were the principles of the Christian institution, what were the real character and actions of its founder, and what the doctrine he promulgated, *then* indeed must we resign our confidence in the sacred text; for then it would be impossible to learn from it, with any degree of certainty, what Christianity originally was.* Now if all this, too, is indecent and irreverent, and of course untrue, and if such changes have attended the transmission of the Bible to us, as that what seems to the common people the direct and obvious import of the text, is not the real import which was present to the minds of the inspired writers, then I beg leave to ask the reviewer, what the common people are to do? They cannot read the Bible in the original languages, and they cannot find its import in the translation, according to the import of language in common use, the only language which they can understand. How then are they to come to the knowledge of the truth? Shall they abandon the maxim, that the Bible is the religion of Protestants, and believe as HIS HOLINESS and the CHURCH believe? This would be to turn back the

*I have heard it suggested that this article was written by the reviewer himself—but of the fact I have no evidence.

hour hand of time to the dark ages, and pour contempt upon the discoveries in mental philosophy and biblical learning, which have blessed these latter days. Shall they study, then, evangelical commentators? These, alas, through ignorance and prejudice, do but "lead to bewilder, and dazzle to blind;" and the Quakers, and the Baptists, and the Antinomians, are all in the same condemnation, relying on proof-texts, which, taken from their connexion, *seem* to favour their views. What then shall the common people do? They must read Unitarian commentators;—for after all these appalling difficulties from changes of customs, and theological prepossessions, and technical phrases, there is a meaning on the sacred pages which is direct and obvious, not only to the inspired writers, but to the minds of unprejudiced readers even now—a meaning which Unitarians, being happily without prejudice, do see, while the rest of the world sit in darkness. All those passages which teach the humanity of Christ have somehow come down to us unobscured, through all the perils of time, and "in a language remarkably different from the original." Indeed, having cleared the breakers of orthodoxy and gotten into still water, the reviewer himself seems to regard the Bible as a very plain book, whose real import is obtained by a strict adherence to the direct and obvious meaning of the terms as they would and must be understood by plain unlettered men. If he were called upon to give a comparative view of Unitarianism and Calvinism, there are no points on which he would insist more in showing the decided superiority of the former, than on its strict adherence to the plain meaning of the plain parts of the Scriptures, and on the ease with which the whole system can be understood and comprehended by men of all capacities. There are, he thinks, but a few passages which occasion

any difficulty, and these, by the light of plainer passages, by the tenor of the gospel, the leading objects of the dispensation, and the researches of scholars, are "in most cases" explained "in a manner perfectly satisfactory." Nay so entirely have all the clouds been dissipated, which lowered just now upon the inspired page, and with such effulgence has the sun broke out upon it, that the whole anti-calvinistic or Unitarian system, can be understood and comprehended by men of all capacities. Indeed the texts are so plain, which contradict all the leading doctrines of Calvinism, that the whole constitution and complexion of the Bible, CAN CONVEY NO OTHER meaning to a plain unlettered man, than is irreconcilably opposed to the fundamental principles of Calvinism. Really, one might as well reason with a pendulum as with such a writer, never in one place, but first in one extreme and then in the other. I hope however he will stick to his last opinion, viz. that the direct and obvious meaning of the Bible, as it is understood by plain unlettered men, is the true meaning; and then he will only have to account for the facts by which I have endeavoured to prove, that the doctrines of the evangelical system are in accordance with the direct and obvious import of the sacred text, as it is understood by plain unlettered men, and for his own concessions, that the predominant import which in all ages actually has been received from the sacred text, is not the Unitarian but the Evangelical import.

The facts which I wish him to explain, are, the confession of learned infidels, that the evangelical is the true doctrinal import of the Bi-

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ble, corroborated by the confession of learned Unitarians after they have stripped of inspired infallibility the opinions and reasonings of prophets and apostles. I desire him also to account for the fact that the Papists, who in doctrine have been, as a body, anti-calvinistic, should have been so bitter in their opposition to the circulation of the Bible, as teaching only to mislead the common people, if the whole constitution and complexion of the moral parts of the Bible *can* convey no other meaning to a plain unlettered man than one irreconcilably opposed to the fundamental principles of Calvinism; and how the reformers should have regarded the translation and spread of "this decidedly anti-calvinistic volume," as the sword of the Spirit in putting to flight the armies of the aliens. But especially would I request the assistance of the reviewer, to enable me to comprehend how a book so decidedly Unitarian, that the whole system can with ease be understood by men of all capacities, and no other meaning can be understood by a plain unlettered man than one irreconcilably opposed to Calvinism—how such a book should have actually been understood to teach the evangelical system of doctrine by a vast majority of mankind who have read the Bible, and should not have been understood to teach the Unitarian system by persons enough at any time or in any nation, to lay a foundation for comparing the practical tendency of the two systems; for he says "unfortunately Unitarianism has never yet prevailed in any country and therefore this comparison cannot be made."

To be continued.

LITERARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE Legislature of Massachusetts, after a discussion protracted through two or three years, has at length granted a charter of incorporation to Amherst College. The act provides for the union of Williams College with that at Amherst, whenever the President and Trustees of the former shall consent to such a union.

Three gentleman from England, who are to be professors in the University of Virginia, have arrived, viz., Dr. Dunglison, Professor of Anatomy; Mr. Boneycastle, Professor of Natural Philosophy; and Mr. Key, Prof. of Mathematics.

The Rev. Dr. Milledoler, of New-York, is appointed President of the Theological Seminary at New-Brunswick, in place of the Rev. Dr. Livingston, deceased.

Measures have been taken for the establishment of a Methodist Episcopal College, within the bounds of the Virginia Conference.

A committee of the Legislature of Maine has reported in favour of an additional grant of \$3000 per ann. to Bowdoin College, for the support of a new Professorship of Modern Languages, and the erection of a chapel.

The first commencement at Columbian College was held at Washington on the 15th of December. The degree of A. B. was conferred on three young gentlemen.

The Baron de Wrangel has been engaged for several years with a large party, in exploring and surveying the northern coasts of Siberia, on the ice, in ascertaining whether Asia and America are separated by water, and in endeavouring to reach the North pole on the ice. The first two objects he is said to have completely accomplished. It is now considered certain, that the two continents are entirely separate. His attempt to reach the North pole on sledges drawn by dogs, failed, in consequence of their meeting with an open sea. In March of 1822, the party left Niji-Kolymsk, and directed their course N. E. upon the ice. After travelling

twenty-two days, a distance of two hundred and thirty-five miles, they met with the open sea in N. lat. $72^{\circ} 3'$ and finding it impossible to proceed further Northward, returned, after a journey on the ice of forty-six days without any kind of shelter, where the thermometer never rose above fifteen degrees below freezing, and frequently fell to twenty-four degrees (of Reaumer it is supposed) below freezing. In an attempt to reach an island which was said to lie N. E. of the Cape of Chalagskoi, they encountered a tempest which lasted many days, and broke up the ice, even to the southward of the party, so that they were several days on a floating mass, surrounded by immense heaps of broken ice, in total want of provisions, and exposed to the greatest dangers before they were able to reach the land. The return of the party, and the details of their expedition, are impatiently expected in Europe.—*Bull. Univ. July.* **

It appears by a letter from Hodgson, the friend of the unfortunate Belzoni, in which he gives an account of the death of the latter, that this celebrated traveller, in consequence of all the information he has received in Benin, has changed his opinion concerning the course of the Niger. Hodgson considers it as proved, that the Niger does not enter the Nile, but enters the Atlantic ocean by many mouths, forming a large *Delta*, between Rio Formoso, or Benin, the Western branch; and Rio del Rey, the Eastern. This supposed delta is on the Western, or rather the Southern coast of Africa, about one thousand miles East of Cape Mesurado. **

According to Capt. Basil Hall, there are in Chili many hundred mines of copper, a much smaller number of silver, and not one fiftieth of the number of gold. This is favourable to the wealth of Chili, if we may trust to the maxim every where received in South America, and said to be uniformly confirmed by experience, 'that a mine of copper is a treasure, a mine of silver is tolerable, but a mine of gold is certain ruin.' **

Boukaria, the centre of the power

of Jenghis Khan, and Tamerlane, has been comparatively unknown to Europeans for several centuries. From various journeys made to that country within a few years, especially from the embassy of Baron de Meyendorf, under authority of the Russian government, in 1820, it appears that it forms an independent kingdom, which is at this day governed by a lineal descendant of Jenghis Khan, *Mir Haider*, who is about forty-eight years of age, and who is eulogized by Meyendorf for his talents and energy. Boukaria is about three hundred and sixty French leagues in length, and three hundred and twenty in breadth, and is supposed to contain three million inhabitants, who are Mohammedans, and extremely under the influence of the priests. The army consists of one hundred and fifty thousand cavalry, besides artillery and infantry. The climate is very warm, the summers being hot, and the winters as mild as in England. The soil is sandy, and would be dried up in summer but that it is irrigated by many canals cut from the rivers, especially the river Kuan Daria. It abounds in gardens, while abundance of corn is raised for the support of the inhabitants. Boukaria, the capital city, contains two hundred thousand inhabitants, four hundred mosques, and thirty colleges; but the houses are principally of clay. Samarcand has one hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants, and is much better built, many of the houses being of stone. Both cities stand on the Kuan Daria. None but Jews, Usbecs, and Turcomans, are taxed, and the revenue is wholly expended, it is said, in supporting the poor. **

Aubert de Vitry, in a notice of the travels of Nuttall, in the *Bulletin Universel*, makes several very liberal and striking remarks on the Geography of North America. He states that the *Missouri*, including the part called the *Mississippi*, is undoubtedly the largest river in the known world. Its length, from its sources in the Rocky Mountains to its entrance into the Gulf of Mexico, is between four thousand and five thousand miles. In ascending three thousand miles from its mouth, it diminishes scarcely in a perceptible degree. The branches which join it below that point,—the *Arkansaw*, *La Platte*, &c. will rank with the greatest rivers in the Old World, while the

branches above are equal to the *Danube* or *Indus*. "No other river within our knowledge, (says the writer,) waters so great an extent of territory, or connects climates so diverse, and so distant." We give this willingly, as an example of the liberal manner in which French writers speak of this country. De Vitry speaks handsomely of Mr. Nuttall, as a philosophical botanist and geologist, and in terms of the highest admiration of his thirst for knowledge, his zeal for the promotion of the natural sciences, and the perseverance, hardihood, and intrepidity exhibited in his scientific excursions; and congratulates the University of Cambridge *in Virginia*, on the advantages to be expected from his being placed over her Botanic Garden. The last sentence betrays less accuracy of acquaintance with the more populous parts of our country, than we should have expected. **

Dr. Wollaston has discovered, from his own experience and that of others, that the nerves which supply the right half of each eye, may lose their power, while those which supply the left, remain capable of vision, and vice versa. In this state of the eyes, one half of the object to which they are directed, will be seen while the other half is invisible. The left side of the face, for instance, is seen while the right is invisible; or when writing, the person can see the letters as they are formed, but not the hand that is forming them. In the case of a friend of his, this fact was preceded by a pain over the left eye, occasioned as he supposes, by the pressure of extravasated blood. Hence he concludes that the optic nerve of the left *thalamus* supplies the left side of each eye, and that of the right *thalamus* the right side, the half of each nerve crossing to the opposite eye. This he terms the *sens. decussation of the optic nerve*, and remarks that it seems to account for our seeing an object *single*, although an image of it is formed in each eye; and also for the fact that infants, as well as others direct both eyes to the same object. We add, that Dr. Reid, in his *Inquiry into the Human Mind*, had determined by a masterly course of inductive reasoning, that there are corresponding parts in the retina of each eye, upon which the same parts of the image fall when the object is seen single, and that this correspondence is nat-

ural and physical, not depending at all on custom or habit. The discovery of Dr. Wollaston shows *why* they correspond; viz. the nerves from each corresponding part unite in the same filament. It is remarkable that Newton, with a sagacity almost prophetic, had suggested the probability of this very anatomical structure, or one similar to it, as accounting for the fact of single vision.* Considered as an anatomical fact, not one in the human frame is more indicative of *design*, whether we regard the importance of the end, or the mechanical nature of the contrivance by which it is effected.

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The discovery of Doebereiner, a German chemist, that *the presence of platinum in a spongy state, has such an influence on the affinities of oxygen and hydrogen gases, as to cause them instantly to combine and form water*, has been applied by himself and others to some practical purposes. Prof. Turner, of Edinburgh, has made it the means of detecting minute quantities of hydrogen gas in the atmosphere. By immersing a ball of spongy platinum mixed with clay and sand, in a tube of air, in which is contained a small quantity of hydrogen, the latter combines with the oxygen of the atmosphere, in that proportion which is necessary to form water, the effect and the degree of it, being indicated by the diminution in volume of the contained air. Doebe-

* Fibris nimirum, quæ sunt in dexteriori parte utriusque nervi, coeuntibus uno in loco, et progredientibus deinceps conjunctim ad cerebrum per nervum qui est a dexteriori parte capitis, fibrisque quæ sunt in sinisteriori parte, &c. *Optice Lucis, Quæst. 15.*

reiner has himself applied this discovery also to the production of an *instantaneous light*, which may be continued at pleasure, and which has been called a *philosophical lamp*. If a small jet of hydrogen be thrown upon a coiled wire, which has been dipped in muriate of platinum, or upon a fragment of spongy platinum, the hydrogen instantly takes fire, and combining with the oxygen of the atmosphere, produces a brilliant light, the platinum itself remaining unaltered. This 'Lampe Pneumatique' has been modified, for more convenient use, by Gardin of Oxford, Cummings of Cambridge, and Adin of Edinburgh; but the principle is the same in all, and it is doubted whether any of them are superior to that of Doebereiner, the inventor.

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M. Bendebendsen, a German physician, has attempted to prove the *magnetic influence of the stars, the sun, and the moon*, and to ascertain the best means of using this influence in therapeutics. The persons supposed to be subjected to this influence, seem to be those who suffer under nervous complaints, walking in sleep, &c. In making trial of the influence of the *stars*, he recommends great caution, since their influence is sometimes salutary, and sometimes dangerous. That of the moon is more mild, and may generally be used with safety on somnambulists. The planets in this respect, are to be classed with the moon.

"The Doctor has experienced the most happy effects in making use of the solar influence in his treatment of a woman whom he mentions."

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Bull. Univ. June 1824.

NEW PUBLICATIONS.

RELIGIOUS.

Religious Institutions dear to the people of God; a Sermon delivered in Berlin, Kensington, on the day of the Public Thanksgiving, Dec. 9, 1824. By the Rev. Royal Robbins.

The Excellence and Influence of the Female character; a Sermon, preached in the Presbyterian Church in Murray-street, at the request of the New-York

Female Missionary Society. By the Rev. Gardiner Spring, D.D.

God the proper object of gratitude; and Thanksgiving a necessary evidence of its sincerity; a Sermon, preached in Pittsfield, Mass. on the day of the State Thanksgiving, Dec. 3, 1824. By Rufus William Bailey, A. M. Pastor of the Congregational Church.

A Discourse on the Proper Character of Religious Institutions; delivered at

the opening of the Independent Congregational Church in Barton Square, Salem, Tuesday, 7th Dec. 1824. By Henry Colman.

The Discriminating Preacher; a Sermon preached in the North Church in the city of Hartford, Dec. 1, 1824, at the Ordination and Installation of the Rev. Carlos Wilcox, as Pastor of said Church. By Gardiner Spring, Pastor of the Brick Presbyterian Church in the city of New-York.

A Vindication of the Divine Inspiration of the Bible; by human Reason and Argument. By M. M. B. Philadelphia. 18mo. pp. 256.

MISCELLANEOUS.

A Greek Grammar of the New Testament: Translated from the German of George Benedict Winer, Professor of Theology at Erlangen. By Moses Stuart, Professor of Sacred Literature in the Theological Seminary, Andover, and Edward Robinson, Assistant Instructor in the same department. Andover, 1825. pp. 176. 8vo.

The American Journal of Science and Arts. Vol. IX. No. 1: February, 1825. pp. 208. S. Converse, New-Haven.

An Oration delivered at Plymouth, Dec. 22, 1824. By Edward Everett. Boston, 1825. pp. 73. 8vo.

The History of the State of New-York, including its Aboriginal and Colonial Annals: Vol. I. Part I. By John V. N. Yates, Secretary of State,

and Joseph W. Moulton, Counsellor at Law.

The Adventures of Congo, in search of his master. An American Tale: containing a true account of a shipwreck; and interspersed with Anecdotes, founded on facts.

Antiquarian Researches; comprising a History of the Indian Wars in the Country bordering on Connecticut River, and parts adjacent: and other interesting events, from the first landing of the Pilgrims to the Conquest of Canada, by the English, in 1760. With notices of Indian depredations in the Neighbouring Country; and of the first planting and progress of settlements in New-England, New-York, and Canada. By E. Hoyt, Esq. author of several Military Works. 1 vol. 8vo.

Lionel Lincoln: or the Leaguer of Boston. By the Author of the Pioneers, Pilot, &c. New-York. 2 vols. 12mo.

John Bull in America: or the New Munchausen. New-York. 1 vol. 12mo. pp. 226.

A Physiological Essay on Digestion. By Nathan R. Smith, M. D. Professor of Anatomy and Physiology, in the University of Vermont. New-York. 8vo. pp. 93.

Views in New-Haven and its vicinity; with a particular description to each view. Drawn and Engraved by J. W. Barber.

Remarks on Washington College, and on the "Considerations" suggested by its establishment. Hartford.

RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

THE American Colonization Society held its Eighth Anniversary at the Capitol in Washington, on Saturday evening, the 19th of February. It was attended by an audience of high respectability, among whom were General Lafayette, the Judges of the Supreme Court, several eminent members of the Bar, and many of the reverend Clergy. Wm. H. Fitzhugh, Esq. presided. The Annual Report was then read by the Rev. Mr. Gurley, Resident Agent of the Society. The prospects of the Society are represented as being, on the whole, encouraging. The town of Monrovia is increasing with rapidity; its defences are complete, and its in-

habitants, for the most part, are contented and happy. The Society's attempts at home, towards an augmentation of its funds, have not yet met with that success they so well deserve.—but the Directors are animated with a determination to persevere in their laudable efforts, until they shall have succeeded in rendering the undertaking an object of national enterprise. When this point shall have been reached, they look upon complete success as certain. The death of Gen. Harper received an appropriate notice, and his enthusiastic devotion to the great design of the Society, was commemorated with becoming eulogy.

The Rev. Loring D. Dewey, in two communications from Hayti, to the Editors of the New-York Observer, represents the reception and accommodation of the emigrants to that Island, as being even more favourable than the most sanguine could have expected.

Want of Bibles.—An agent of the American Bible Society states that "Recent accounts from two County Societies in Kentucky present the following facts: The Commissioner of taxes found in his district, one half of Harrison county, 400 families without the Scriptures. Another Commissioner in Scott county, out of 572 taxable persons, found 327 destitute, some of whom were professors of religion.

"I have no doubt," he adds, "but that three or four millions of our population are unblessed with the light of God's word in their houses. If the American Bible Society, in eight years, has been enabled only to issue 309,000 Bibles and Testaments, when will it be able to meet the wants of the destitute in a country whose population is doubling every twenty-five years? In addition to all this, Mexico and South America are crying to us for the word of life. Shall we do any thing for them, or must we leave them to the mercies of the Christians of Great Britain, who are, indeed, already doing much more for the southern parts of our continent, than we are enabled to do."

Connecticut Missionary Society.—From the twenty-sixth Annual Narrative of the Missions of this Society we gather the following facts: *Forty missionaries* have been employed, some of them during the whole year, and some for shorter periods. Their fields of labour have been, the western counties of New-York, New Connecticut, and other parts of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and New-Orleans. The expenses of the Society for the year amount to \$7,696.90. The contributions of the churches in May, amounted to \$1,934.25. Every year of the history of this Society furnishes new evidence of its importance, and strengthens its claims on all who regard the best interests, civil as well as moral, of our western settlements.

DONATIONS TO RELIGIOUS AND CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS.

In the month of January.

To the American Education Society, \$2,488.43.

To the American Bible Society, \$2,778. Bibles issued from the Depository, 1,082, Testaments 1,018.

To the American Board of Missions, \$3,835.83, exclusive of legacies, &c.

To the United Foreign Missionary Society, \$1,517 56.

To the Baptist Board of Foreign Missions, since Dec. 29th, \$2,179.56.

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Godfrey Haga, Esq. a citizen of Philadelphia, lately deceased, has left an estate of more than \$300,000, which he disposed of by will, in the following manner:

"To the Pennsylvania hospital, the sum of \$1,000. To the Northern Dispensary, \$1,000. To the Southern Dispensary, \$1,000. To the Pennsylvania Institution for the Deaf and Dumb, \$1,000. To the German Society, \$2,000. To the Bible Society, \$4,000. To the Widows' Asylum, \$5,000. To the Orphan Asylum, \$10,000. To sundry persons, \$50,500. To the Brethren's Church, (the Moravian Church,) in Philadelphia, \$2,000. For the relief of superannuated preachers, their widows, and missionaries and their widows, belonging to the Brethren's Church, \$6,000. To the Society for Propagating the Gospel among the Heathen, \$30,000. This constitutes a fund, the interest of which is to be applied by the Society for the purpose of educating pious young men at Nazareth Hall, for the Gospel Ministry.

The rest of his estate, valued at more than two hundred thousand dollars, is bequeathed to the said Society for propagating the Gospel among the Heathen, and to be appropriated from time to time, as the Society shall direct. Mr. Haga, who had no patrimonial estate, acquired his large fortune by industry and economy. Throughout life, he sustained the character of a *good* man, (we use the word emphatically,) and did not wait till the hour of death to become charitable. For his connexions, both in this country and in Ger-

many, he made provision while he was in the enjoyment of health. His donations for the relief of the poor, and to public institutions, were many and munificent. When the Brethren in Philadelphia determined a few years ago to rebuild their Church, he gave

them five thousand dollars: and those who were best acquainted with him, say, that from the time of Mrs. Haga's death, until his own dissolution, he expended in charity, more than one hundred thousand dollars."

ORDINATIONS AND INSTALLATIONS.

Jan 5.—The Rev. CHARLES WHITE, over the Church in Thetford, Vt., as colleague Pastor with the Rev. Dr. Burton. Sermon by the Rev. President Tyler, of Dartmouth College.

Jan. 12.—The Rev. SAMUEL EVERETT, at Milford, N. H. Sermon by the Rev. Elisha Andrews, of Princeton, Mass.

Jan. 12. The Rev. SIMEON WOODRUFF was installed Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, in Strongville, Ohio.

Jan. 18.—The Rev. JAMES ABELL, Pastor of the Presbyterian Church in Oswego, N. Y. Sermon by the Rev. Henry Smith.

Jan. 19.—The Rev. JOHN SESSIONS, over the Church at Adams, N. Y. Sermon by the Rev. Mr. Platt, of Rutland.

Jan. 19.—The Rev. DARIUS O. GRISWOLD, over the Church at Watertown, Conn. Sermon by the Rev. Mr. Hart, of Plymouth.

Jan. 20.—The Rev. WILLIAM H. LEVERETT, over the Baptist Church in Roxbury, Mass. Sermon by the Rev. Daniel Sharpe, of Boston.

Feb. 2.—The Rev. L. E. LATHROP, (installed) over the Congregational Church and Society in Salisbury, Con. Sermon by the Rev. Mr. Bradford.

Feb. 5.—The Rev. WILLIAM CROOKSHANK, over the Reformed Dutch Churches of Flatlands and New Lots, L. I. Sermon by the Rev. Mr. Bogart, of North Hempstead.

Feb. 8.—The Rev. ALBERT BARNES, over the Presbyterian Church in Morristown, N. J. Sermon by the Rev. John M'Dowell, D. D.

Feb. 9.—The Rev. SAMUEL BARRETT, over the Twelfth Congregational Church in Boston. Sermon by the Rev. Dr. Lowell.

Feb. 16.—The Rev. SYLVESTER WOODBRIDGE, Pastor of the Presbyterian Church in Greenville, N. Y. Sermon by the Rev. Dr. Porter of Catskill.

Feb. 23.—The Rev. JOSHUA LEAVITT, Pastor of the Church in Stratford, Conn. Sermon by the Rev. Dr. Taylor, of New-Haven.

VIEW OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS.

CONGRESSIONAL.

AMONG the most interesting subjects which have occupied the attention of Congress, during its present session, are the occupation of the Oregon, the suppression of Piracy, and the honours shown to General Lafayette. The bill authorizing the occupation of the Oregon, previous to its being passed, was so amended as to provide only for a military occupation of the mouth of the river. This amendment was adopted for the purpose of avoiding a violation of the treaty with Great Britain, which provides that the boundary line on that

frontier shall remain unsettled ten years.

On the subject of Piracy, the President, in a message to the Senate, suggested three expedients; one, by the pursuit of the offenders to the settled as well as unsettled parts of the Islands from whence they issue; another, by reprisal on the inhabitants; and the third, by a blockade of the ports of those Islands. These suggestions have given rise to a bill in the Senate, which embraces the several expedients proposed in the message, and which has been for some weeks a prominent topic of debate. The opposers of the bill

contend that it introduces a new principle into the rights of nations, and that a resort to the measures proposed by it would be in effect a declaration of war with Spain. This objection was anticipated by the President, and obviated by him on the ground that the Spanish authorities are utterly incapable of suppressing the practice in question. The discussion of the subject has led to a disclosure of facts which, in respect to its atrocities, and the numbers concerned in it, exceed conjecture. It has been made to appear that not only the miserable wretches who are immediately engaged in it, but that thousands of the citizens, and even the local authorities, are implicated in this nefarious business. "Your table," said Mr. Mills of the Senate, "is loaded with the melancholy recital. The representations of individual sufferers; the communications of your authorized agents in the very theatre of their cruelties; the united voice of the whole commercial community; the official reports of your Navy Department, and the recommendations of the Executive, all combine in urging the necessity of active and energetic measures to arrest the progress of this infernal practice. Indeed, it seems to be admitted by all, that something must speedily be done."

A resolution has been submitted to the Senate, by Mr. King of N. Y. in the following words: "That as soon as the portion of the existing funded debt of the U. S. for the payment of which the public lands of the U. S. are pledged, shall have been paid off, then, and thenceforth, the whole of the public lands of the U. S. with the net proceeds of all future sales thereof, shall constitute and form a fund, which is hereby appropriated, and the faith of the United States is pledged, that the said fund shall be inviolably applied, to aid the emancipation of such slaves, and the removal of such free persons of colour in any of the said states, as by the laws of the states respectively, may be allowed to be emancipated or removed, to any

territory or country without the limits of the United States of America." This resolution recognises one fact which has been constantly denied at the south; viz. that slavery is a national and not merely a state or individual concern. On many accounts we are glad that this great evil should become a subject of national legislation, in any form; but of the expediency of the measure proposed by Mr. K. we have strong doubts. We should hope that the free States would be willing to make any possible sacrifices for the deliverance of a million and a half of human beings from the lowest condition of humanity, and for the redemption of the national character from its worst reproach; but whether pledging the wealth of the nation as a fund in which the slave holder may rest secure of an equivalent for his supernumerary slaves, whenever he may find it for his interest to dispose of them, be the readiest way to accomplish the object contemplated, is a question, and not the only question involved in the resolution, which requires deep and solemn consideration.

A very interesting document from the Department of War, exhibiting a detailed plan for the concentration and colonization of all the Indians within the limits of the United States, has been submitted to Congress, accompanied by a message from the President. We forbear to remark on this project here, as our limits forbid, and also because the subject demands more reflection than we have at present time to give it.

The electors of President of the United States having failed to make a choice, the election devolved on the House of Representatives. That body proceeded on the 9th of February to the discharge of this duty, and the result of their balloting was, for John Quincy Adams, 13 states; for Andrew Jackson, 7 states; for William H. Crawford, 4 states. Mr. Adams therefore, having a majority, was declared duly elected.

ERRATUM.—Page 117, line 14, 2d column, in some copies for *strong-sided*, read *strong-siding*.